

NON-REGULAR TROOPS IN THE ERA OF DECLINE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN COSSACKS AND AUSTRIAN GRENZERS OF THE 1860s

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Abstract. *Austrian historian A. Kappeler suggests that a detailed comparison of Russian Cossack troops and the Austrian Militärgrenze (Military Frontier) will be extremely revealing. The paper shows that such comparison was ventured as early as in 1860 by a Russian general, N. I. Krasnov. He demonstrated that non-regular troops in a European state of the nineteenth century were doomed to extinction for economic reasons. Based on archival materials on Cossacks and Grenzers in the Russian State Military Historical Archive, State Archive of the Rostov Region and the Manuscripts Department at the National Library of Russia, we show that forecasts made by N. I. Krasnov were substantiated. The result of the paper is the conclusion that in the 1860s, non-regular troops of the classical type were doomed.*

Keywords: *Grenzers, Cossacks, military reforms, settled troops, N. I. Krasnov.*

Introduction

A Russian historian who endeavours to analyse the “similarity” of the Cossack troops which once existed in their country and the Austrian Militärgrenze immediately finds themselves in a difficult situation. This similarity was mentioned in Russian translations of German articles as early as the middle of the nineteenth century,¹ and in the late twentieth century it came into the sight of Russian scholars in Cossack studies.² However, Russian-language works, as a rule, stopped at an acknowledgement of some abstract commonality.

The reason behind this situation is the fact that the history of the Militärgrenze has so far remained a kind of *terra incognita* for Russian readers: a sphere of historiographical myths and specific half-truths. Even if they know of Grenzers, their knowledge is usually limited to the idea of them as excellent natural warriors who have a thirst for battles, owed their full allegiance to their country and for many centuries were guards on the European border against the Ottoman Turks. This image, as can be easily

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¹ Wickede 1859, p. 677.

² *Kazachii Don* 1995, p. 25-33.

seen, is very close to that of another class of excellent warriors – the Russian Cossacks. However, the point is that the notion of said similarity was cultivated from the very beginning under the influence of people who were hardly aware of the situation in the border regiments, and whose judgments were grounded on extremely limited information. For example, one of the few modern Russian historians who were specifically engaged in the study of the past of the Militärgrenze, Yu. V. Kostyashov, quotes two very interesting views on Grenzers which were expressed by Russian diplomats in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was then, as early as in 1697-1698, that a Russian stolnik (a court office in Muscovy, responsible for serving the royal table), P. A. Tolstoy, was perhaps the first one to suggest the similarity of the people living on the Militärgrenze (more precisely, of Serbs who migrated to the area) with Cossacks. In his diary, he wrote: “Those Serbs are military people, *similar in all aspects to the Don Cossacks* [italics added by authors], they all speak the Slavic language. [...] They are very friendly and respectful to the Muscovite people.”³ The Russian diplomat and statesman proved to be very sagacious, because he managed to notice the similarity between the military settlers of the two neighbouring states in a brief trip across the possessions of the Republic of Venice in the Balkans. However, the brevity of this trip makes us doubt the absolute accuracy of the conclusions reached by P. A. Tolstoy. The testimony of another Russian diplomat, Ambassador to Vienna, L. Lanchinsky, looks even less credible. In 1747, Lanchinsky informed Empress Elizaveta Petrovna of the opinion voiced by Austrian Field Marshal Hildburghausen concerning the “Croats”⁴ that were part of the border regiments:

He greatly praised the nation, especially the fact that from the very start of his command, not a single person deserted for the enemy, and those who still went away left for their homes and villages, but did not disappear. The people are healthy and good marchers.⁵

Besides the fact that the diplomat might have distorted the considerations of the foreign officer during translation, the officer himself never saw Grenzers in battle and grounded his account of them exclusively on their behaviour on the march. However, Yu. V. Kostyashov relies on these two opinions of the Russian officials, who openly sympathise with the “Slav brethren,” without reservation, in contrast to official Austrian documents that pictured the Militärgrenze in much less heroic colours. The allegations that they contained saying that in peacetime Grenzers “idly sat at home,” and that in wartime

³ Kostyashov 1997a, p. 141.

⁴ Croats traditionally refer to Grenzer units of the mid-eighteenth century in the Russian historiography.

⁵ Kostyashov 1997a, p. 140.

there were situations when they “flew back home in droves,” are attributed by the modern Russian historian solely to the hostile attitudes of Croatian and Hungarian officials towards Serbian Grenzers.⁶

We do not mean that the soldiers of the border regiments were bad warriors, or that their comparison with Russian Cossacks is based on false assumptions. However, the image of the Grenzers as ideal border guards, committed to the Slavic traditions and incapable of desertion, which was created by Russian travellers and diplomats who were only vaguely aware of the real situation on the *Militärgrenze*, is just as comical and divorced from reality as the image of the stereotypical Cossack in the eyes of Europeans. Here is how the most brilliant Austrian historian A. Kappeler ironically describes this image:

Cossacks – this concept conveys the idea of wild Asian mounted hordes in the service of Russia, consisting of valiant and cruel horsemen, swinging with whips, peaks or sabres, having moustaches, wearing colourful gorgeous uniforms and bizarre fur headgear or scalp locks on their heads.⁷

A person who knows well the history of the Cossacks, with its complexities, contradictions and tragic episodes, cannot seriously take such a string of clichés. But can a person who knows the history of the *Militärgrenze* seriously take the image developed by many Russian historians?

Meanwhile, this idealised image is maintained not only in the works of Yu. V. Kostyashov. For example, T. N. Kandaurova, to characterise the combat efficiency of border regiments, cites only two extremely complementary pieces of evidence provided by foreign contemporaries (although not Russians): a researcher of Serbian history, F. Taube, who called the *Militärgrenze* “the greatest jewel of the House of Austria,” and the Napoleonic marshal Auguste de Marmont, who claimed that Grenzers “give the Austrian Empire a seventy-thousand-strong army, prepared for war at any time, and which costs it almost nothing in peacetime.” Her representation of the life led by the Grenzers has no place in it for any serious problems as the researcher writes only about the positive aspects of the existence of the *Militärgrenze*.⁸ Additionally, T. N. Kandaurova considers border regiments to be stable entities that underwent little change over time,⁹ based, by the way, on the words of Yu. V. Kostyashov that although “before the nineteenth century, at least 30 attempts were made to improve the Grenzer system, [...] its essence remained unchanged.”¹⁰ And as a result the history of the

⁶ Kostyashov 1997b, p. 89.

⁷ Kappeler 2014, p. 10.

⁸ Kandaurova 2010, p. 87-95.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

¹⁰ Kostyashov 1997a, p. 144.

Grenzers is written on the basis of their actions in their most successful time periods: Yu. V. Kostyashov, in particular, is an expert in the history of the Serbs of the eighteenth century, and even published a monograph on this subject,¹¹ but unfortunately, in his papers, he extends the features of the service of the Grenzers of this time to the next century as well.¹²

As a consequence, the image of the border regiments of the 1860s presented in the works of these two authors is very far from what a Russian military agent in Vienna, F. F. Tornau, described in his reports to Saint Petersburg, or from what the Russian consul in Rijeka, L. V. Berezin, witnessed. For example, Yu. V. Kostyashov believes that the “days of the former military service” are remembered as a golden age by Grenzers who did not really need liberal reforms.¹³ T. N. Kandaurova characterises the *Militärgrenze* of the mid-nineteenth century as being “not only a military and agricultural area, but also as an industrial and trading region,” which additionally fulfilled “certain socio-cultural functions, including the one of forging the educational space and cultural potential of the Austrian territories.”¹⁴ Of course, there are also much more objective works in modern Russian historiography, describing a very mixed picture on the *Militärgrenze* in this period. We would highlight the texts by V. I. Freidzon¹⁵ and A. M. Dronov,¹⁶ but with the one reservation that they are unlikely to be of particular interest to the Serbian or Croatian reader, since their basis is mainly built on the retelling of Yugoslav authors. However, such works are scarce, and information on the Grenzers is diverse and inaccurate. In the end, a historian of Russian Cossacks trying to compare Cossack troops and the *Militärgrenze*, as a rule, compares real Cossacks to a mythologised and idealised image of the Grenzers.

It is not surprising that the outcome usually fails to meet with expectations: indeed, major historians of the Don Cossackdom, such as A. P. Skorik and R. G. Tikidzhyan, when undertaking to determine the role of the “Cossack phenomenon in the history of humanity,” committed a number of glaring errors in their attempts to compare the Don Host and the *Militärgrenze*. According to these authors, Grenzers fought not only against Ottomans, but also against the Austrian Empire, and the fact that they had no patron-power “did not contribute to the survival of large permanent settlements and townships, excluded the possibility of maintaining a peaceful economy and securing controlled territories for them.” Moreover, the

¹¹ Kostyashov 1997b.

¹² Kostyashov 1997a, p. 140-145.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹⁴ Kandaurova 2010, p. 94-95.

¹⁵ Freidzon 1963; Freidzon 2001.

¹⁶ Dronov 2016.

disappearance of the *Militärgrenze* is allegedly caused, among other reasons, by “the forming and strengthening power of the Austrian Empire!”¹⁷ It is obvious that the authors, who never specifically dealt with the history of the border regiments, too literally understood the historiographical myth of the Habsburg yoke over southern Slavs, and the violent struggle of the *Grenzers* against this yoke.

So why, despite all the above, not only do we venture to compare Russian Cossack troops and the Austrian *Militärgrenze*, but also to publish our paper in an international journal? The answer is that we in principle consider a comparative study of the histories of Cossacks and *Grenzers* to be a very promising project. And we are not alone in holding this opinion. A. Kappeler, mentioned above, repeatedly points to specific examples of “striking similarity” between these two military classes in his recently published monograph *Kazachestvo. Istorija i legendy*. He believes that both Russian Cossack troops and the *Militärgrenze* were “special social and political structures with their own privileges, greater freedoms and frontier mentality, differing from the prevailing mass of unfree peasants within the country.” Summing up the discussion on this subject, the distinguished Austrian historian predicts that “a detailed comparison [of Cossacks and *Grenzers* – authors’ note], certainly, can further elucidate the phenomenon of the border communities in general and the history of Cossacks in particular.”¹⁸ However, it seems to us that to accomplish such a “detailed comparison,” the researcher should have a good command of the factual material both on the history of Cossack troops and that of the *Militärgrenze*.

We do not claim the role of such researchers, but in the course of our exploration into the history of the Don Cossackdom, we decided that comparing the processes that took place in the 1860s in the Don Host and in the border regiments would have a visionary effect. This idea was prompted by the works of another major modern Cossack scholar, A. A. Volvenko. In one of his papers, the Russian researcher writes that in the early 1860s, when the Russian Ministry of War made preparations to launch serious changes in the Cossack troops,

[...] the military agent in Vienna, Baron F. F. Tornau, was instructed to collect information on the policy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to gradually transfer the entire population of the so-called “*Militärgrenze*,” whose position was akin to that of Cossacks, from the class subject to military service to the civilian status.¹⁹

In another text, the historian expresses the thought even more clearly:

¹⁷ *Kazachii Don* 1995, p. 25-33.

¹⁸ Kappeler 2014, p. 83.

¹⁹ Volvenko 2007, p. 47-56.

[...] the determination shown by the military authority in its undertaking to transform the Cossackdom was empowered, among many circumstances, by the experience of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in reorganising the so-called “*Militärgrenze*” on its outskirts.²⁰

The assertion that the reforms of the border regiments in the early 1860s in a sense served as a prototype for later changes in the Cossack troops seemed sensational to us without exaggeration, and after reading the works of A. A. Volvenko we were eager to read both the reports of F. F. Tornau, devoted to the reforms of the *Militärgrenze*, and the documents of the Non-Regular Troops Authority²¹ which had provided foundation for Volvenko’s bold statement.

However, the very first look at the archival materials was enough to understand that yet another Russian historian had been deluded by the lack of a deep knowledge of the past of the border regiments and inadequate attention to the sources dedicated to them. F. F. Tornau wrote with absolute straightforwardness that the transfer of *Grenziers* into the civilian status was started on 8 June 1871.²² His reports of the 1860s mentioned only an abstract desire felt by a part of the Austrian generals to demilitarise the *Militärgrenze*,²³ and there is no documented evidence that information on this desire, which was not even supported by specific transformation plans, had any noticeable effect on the policy of the Russian Ministry of War in relation to the Cossack troops.

We can only speak with confidence of one careful reader of the reports sent by F. F. Tornau. The reader held a modest position as an officer for special assignments under the Head of the Non-Regular Troops Authority.²⁴ However, Nikolai Krasnov had a brilliant military and scientific career before him: he was to become Lieutenant-General, the largest Don statistician of the second half of the nineteenth century, and a delegate at the statistical congress in Pest, where he represented the whole of Russia.²⁵ By the middle of the 1860s, N. I. Krasnov was acknowledged as the author of the first two published historical and statistical descriptions of the Don Host Oblast – *Materialy dlya geografii i statistiki Rossii, sobrannye ofitserami Generalnogo Shtaba. Zemlya voyska Donskogo*.²⁶ During these years, the young officer was an active participant in discussions on the future of the Cossacks, and over time he

²⁰ Volvenko 2014b, p. 382.

²¹ A body under the Ministry of War of the Russian Empire between 1857 and 1867, responsible for the management of Cossack troops.

²² RSMHA, fund 428, opis 1, delo 112, leafs 47-48.

²³ Ibid., fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leafs 40-47.

²⁴ *Spisok* 1891, p. 445.

²⁵ Korolev 1991, p. 234-244.

²⁶ Krasnov 1864.

came to the conclusion that reforms in the Russian Cossack army should be planned, guided by immediate needs but also based on long-term trends in the evolution of non-regular troops across the world. And the task, entrusted to him by his management, to calculate the ratio of spend on the regular units to that on the units of the Orenburg Cossack Host,²⁷ became a driver that inspired the Don statistician to create a study unique to the Russian literature, a study into the financial performance of the non-regular system, using both data on the Cossack troops and on the Militärgrenze.

We are now working on the publication of this work by N. I. Krasnov, entitled by the author *Soobrazheniya o tom, vygodna li dlya gosudarstva v finansovom otnoshenii sistema vystavleniya irregulyarnykh voisk ot osobykh naselenii, pol'zuyushchikhsya za otbyvanie etoi voivskoi povinnosti l'gotami i privilegijami*.²⁸ Therefore, in this paper, it is significant to only elaborate on the most important conclusion made by the officer of the Ministry of War. By employing specific examples, he insisted that for the two Eastern European powers, the Russian and Austrian empires, the time had long past when military settlers brought benefits for the state treasury. This Russian and Austrian experience allowed N. I. Krasnov to formulate the following general conclusion: “along with the growing rural and urban industries and trade in the country, which contribute annually to the sources of state revenues, the opinion regarding the relative cheapness of settled troops is weakening.”²⁹ Our view is that the work of the Don statistician, which for the first time contained a detailed analysis of economic issues equally relevant to the Militärgrenze and Russian Cossack Host, rather than an abstract reference to a certain “similarity” between Cossacks and Grenzlers, revolutionised the Russian literature. Its publication in the 1860s could have effectively stimulated the interest of Russian military officials and Cossack public figures in the system of border regiments, by demonstrating that the Austrian practice could really be leveraged in the preparation of reforms for Cossack troops.

Alas, this did not happen. A. A. Volvenko suggested that the text of N. I. Krasnov was at least made known to the management of the military authority, which positively assessed the ideas contained in it.³⁰ However, our archival search as it progressed in the Russian State Military Historical Archive did not discover any evidence of this (RSMHA). On the contrary, the final copy of the manuscript by the officer of the Non-Regular Troops Authority, containing gross errors in some calculations, which were never

²⁷ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leaf 1.

²⁸ Peretyatko 2016a; Peretyatko 2017b.

²⁹ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leaf 117r.-v.

³⁰ Volvenko 2007, p. 47-56.

corrected,³¹ was filed away in the archives with numerous accompanying documents on its creation, but without any papers confirming that it was read by senior officials at the Ministry of War. We believe that by 1867, when the Don statistician had completed his treatise, the statements that it contained were perceived as too bold and radical to his direct supervisors, and they preferred to literally hand the revolutionary study over for perpetual storage without attempting to put it into practice.³²

However, after the rediscovery of *Soobrazheniya o tom, vygodna li dlya gosudarstva v finansovom otnoshenii sistema vystavleniya irregulyarnykh voisk ot osobykh naselenii, pol'zuyushchikhsya za othvyvanie etoi voinskoi povinnosti l'gotami i privilegiiami* by N. I. Krasnov and its partial publication, it is clear now that long before A. Kappeler, the leading statistician and expert on the history of the Don, one of the first true Cossack scholars, not only called for a “detailed comparison” of Cossacks and Grenzers, but also tried to conduct this comparison independently, albeit looking only at the economic aspects that were close to him. And it does not matter that the statement of A. A. Volvenko – that as the Ministry of War implemented its reforms of Cossack society in the 1860s it relied on some experience of a similar transformation of border regiments – turned out to be another historiographical myth. We can see a high potential in further development and logical completion of the research started by N. I. Krasnov by continuing the comparison of Cossack troops and the Militärgrenze in the decade under review.

Materials and methods

Luckily, it was the period of the Grenzers' history that is of interest to us that was well reflected in the materials of the RSMHA archives. F. F. Tornau was one of the most prolific Russian military agents in Vienna, and many of his reports and communications paid some attention to the Militärgrenze.³³ Additionally, in the late 1860s, B. Katalinich, a Grenzer officer and adventurer who had planned to spark the anti-Habsburg uprising in the Balkans, emigrated to Russia. The Russian Ministry of War did not entertain any specific hopes in relation to him – either it really considered it possible to orchestrate such insurgency or it used B. Katalinich as a source of information on the Austrian army.³⁴ The fruits of the labour of the Austrian adventurer included a series of remarkable texts which contained clearly exaggerated information on the hatred felt by southern Slavs against the Austrian Empire along with descriptions of specific details in the organisation

³¹ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leaf 155.

³² Peretyatko 2017c, p. 13-16.

³³ RSMHA, fund 428, opis 1, delo 104; RSMHA, fund 428, opis 1, delo 112.

³⁴ Nigalatiy 2007, p. 148-161.

of border regiments.³⁵ Unfortunately, the materials by F. F. Tornau and B. Katalinich have not yet been employed by Russian researchers of the *Militärgrenze*, although specialists in Cossack studies and historians of Pan-Slavism respectively are partially familiar with them. Therefore, before proceeding to compare Cossacks and *Grenzers*, we tried to systematise these texts by publishing a series of papers covering Russian archival materials on the history of border regiments.³⁶ We believe that even Croatian and Serbian authors may find it important to know the information reported by F. F. Tornau on the sentiments of the Austrian generals, or be introduced to the history of relations between the Russian Ministry of War and Croatian politicians, mediated by B. Katalinich.

Of course, sources dedicated to the Cossack history of the 1860s have a more complete representation in the Russian archives. RSMHA preserved thousands of files created in the course of correspondence between army administrations and the Ministry of War and as a result of administrative activities accomplished by officials in the imperial government. This collection comprises not only the above manuscript by N. I. Krasnov, but also projects for the updated organisation of Cossack troops.³⁷ The State Archive of the Rostov Region (SARR) houses materials of the Don commissions and committees,³⁸ unpublished manuscripts by local figures³⁹ which illustrate clearly the sentiments in Cossack society. Finally, the Manuscripts Department at the National Library of Russia (MDRNL) stores a very diverse and varied array of documents on the economic situation of Cossacks collected by a prominent army official, N.A. Maslakovets.⁴⁰ The archival materials are supported by numerous published texts – statistical accounts and memoirs – whose authors were contemporaries of the turbulent 1860s in the Cossack troops. The most complete description of the situation in the largest of these troops, the Don Host, was provided by N. I. Krasnov in the above two books, but due regard should also be paid to texts by A. A. Karasev,⁴¹ V. D. Novitsky,⁴² I. I. Krasnov⁴³ and others. As for works created by modern researchers, the second half of the nineteenth century drew

³⁵ RSMHA, fund 428, opis 1, delo 108; RSMHA, fund 430, opis 1, delo 7.

³⁶ Peretyatko 2016b; Peretyatko 2016c; Peretyatko 2017d.

³⁷ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 1, delo 8; RSMHA, fund 330, opis 1, delo 17; RSMHA, fund 330, opis 1, delo 23.

³⁸ SARR, fund 55, opis 1, delo 240; SARR, fund 55, opis 1, delo 70.

³⁹ SARR, fund 55, opis 1, delo 34.

⁴⁰ MDRNL, fund 1055, delo 24; MDRNL, fund 1055, delo 104.

⁴¹ Karasev 1896; Karasev 1900.

⁴² Novitsky 1991.

⁴³ Krasnov 1862; I. K. 1865.

relatively little attention from historians of Cossacks until recent decades.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, we should note the valuable, relatively recently published books by A. P. Skorik,⁴⁵ A. N. Malukalo,⁴⁶ R. G. Tikidzhyan⁴⁷ and, especially, by A. A. Volvenko⁴⁸ which review this period.

The basis for our study will be provided by the historical and comparative method. However, to compare the situation in the Cossack troops and the Militärgrenze, it is first necessary to reconstruct this situation, and often such a reconstruction has to be built on highly subjective sources. For this reason, we will also actively apply the method of historical reconstruction and the historical and biographical method.

Discussions

As we wrote above, N. I. Krasnov, after he collated information on Russian Cossacks and Austrian Grenziers, arrived at the conclusion that both these classes of military settlers experienced similar economic problems. Unfortunately, the Don statistician did not always clearly formulate his thoughts, and his contemporaries had already stressed this fact. M. Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin called N. I. Krasnov a “lay writer,” an “awkward” user of words.⁴⁹ For this reason, his *Soobrazheniya o tom, vygodna li dlya gosudarstva v finansovom otnoshenii sistema vystavleniya irregulyarnykh voisk ot osobykh naselenii, pol'zuyushchikhsya za othvyvanie etoi voinskoi povinnosti l'gotami i privilegyami* makes it sometimes difficult to decipher what the author considers to be the most important points, and what he supplies only as additional comments, what conclusions are only applicable to Russian Cossacks, and which ones are applicable to all settled troops. One of our research efforts aimed to isolate the core of the arguments put by the Russian officer, and compile a brief enumeration of the factors that, in his opinion, doomed non-regular troops to extinction in a developed European state of the nineteenth century. However, for the reasons mentioned above, this list is only an approximate description.

1) Let us repeat once the view of N. I. Krasnov that non-regular troops would be led to an unhappy fate not by military factors, but by economic ones. Moreover, to simplify his analysis, he completely excluded the military component from his reasoning.⁵⁰ According to the Don statistician, the privileges granted to both Grenziers and Cossacks were “tremendous,” and

⁴⁴ Chuikov et al. 2016.

⁴⁵ Skorik 2015.

⁴⁶ Malukalo 2003.

⁴⁷ Tikidzhyan 2013.

⁴⁸ Volvenko 2017.

⁴⁹ Saltykov-Shchedrin 1864.

⁵⁰ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leaf 117v.

giving them to a part of the population “only caused the state treasury to incur expenses” even if the non-regular units were equipped and partially paid at their own expense.⁵¹

2) On the other hand, the vision of the Russian officer shared some common points with modern authors who consider Cossacks and Grenziers as peculiar “border communities.” N. I. Krasnov wrote that Russian Cossacks were an efficient structure, while “Russia was surrounded by wild and nomadic hordes,” and “Cossacks repelled raids of nomadic peoples and at the same time were the first colonisers in our border areas.”⁵² However, by the 1860s, these times were long gone, and “with the elimination of Russia’s border enemies, special provisions of the government designed to protect the borders of the empire, which mainly mean to found military settlements, known under the name of Cossacks, become out of place from year to year.”⁵³ The statistician also cited a similar opinion of some of the Austrian generals, retold by F. F. Tornau, which argued that the *Militärgrenze* should be abolished because “the reasons that prompted for it to be given a military organisation no longer existed.”⁵⁴

3) Why did it become impractical to keep the non-regular organisation of troops? N. I. Krasnov managed to formulate a very clear and almost aphoristic answer: “The general conscription of a certain population prevents it from developing rural and urban industries, invest its capital for trade enterprises and generally follow the path of citizenship.”⁵⁵ Both on the *Militärgrenze* and in Cossack troops of the Russian Empire, an outside observer could easily see the consequences of this duty: although the statement of the Don officer that “Cossack territories,” allegedly, were “barely able to feed the population and brought no income to the state budget,”⁵⁶ was an obvious exaggeration, the economic potential of these territories in the 1860s was, without doubt, utilised inadequately.⁵⁷ In the border regiments, the situation was even more transparent. All sources fully correspond to the statement of F. F. Tornau, which stated that in them “a considerable portion of land was uncultivated, and the sources of well-being offered by this fertile area brought the most insignificant benefits.”⁵⁸

4) Proceeding from all the above, the officer of the Central Non-Regular Troops Authority considered both the Cossacks and Grenziers to be

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, leafs 119r.-v.

⁵² *Ibid.*, leaf 122.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, leaf 115.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, leaf 41v.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, leaf 121v.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, leafs 116v.-117.

⁵⁷ Peretyatko 2017a.

⁵⁸ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leaf 40.

doomed from the historical perspective. Transferring them to a civilian status seemed to him a logical step which would be followed by many positive changes. “If exempted from conscription, they [Cossacks] would focus their work efforts and money on industry, improve their material well-being and, therefore, contribute new resources to the productive forces of the state.”⁵⁹ In support of his idea, N. I. Krasnov cited the account of F. F. Tornau of the views maintained by the group of Austrian generals whose members expected from the demilitarisation of the *Militärgrenze* “the financial benefits that were to be returned to the state following the colonisation of empty border lands and their free exploitation.”⁶⁰ Following his line of reasoning, the Don statistician came to the following formulation which, while applied to Russian Cossacks, could also be extended to all non-regular troops:

[...] when the Cossack military population is maintained in place of regular troops, the state treasury is to incur losses due to receiving less profits from a certain population, and the material well-being of Cossacks themselves is far inferior to what could develop from the application of free labour to fertile lands.⁶¹

N. I. Krasnov was a bright and emotional personality who was not always apt to perceive reality in an objective way. His *Soobrazheniya o tom, vygodna li dlya gosudarstva v finansovom otnoshenii sistema vystavleniya irregulyarnykh voisk ot osobykh naselenii, pol'zuyushchikhsya za othyvanie etoi voinskoi povinnosti l'gotami i privilegiiyami* were written in the context of the party struggle, and contain numerous distortions and inaccuracies. However, they can only be detected in the part where the Don author touched on the burning issue that concerned him – the issue of the forthcoming reforms of Cossack troops. While the practical part of his text, where he predicted an immediate and almost magical result from the transferring of Cossack troops to a civilian class (N. I. Krasnov promised multimillion profits to the government in the first years of the reform alone),⁶² seems doubtful to us, the theoretical arguments of the Russian officer appear to be convincing, supported by the history of the further development of the Cossacks and *Grenzers*.

We think it is necessary to add another essential detail to them which N. I. Krasnov did not mention. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the developing military arts featured increasingly tougher requirements for soldiering equipment and accordingly continuously rising accoutrement prices. Meanwhile, the *Militärgrenze* were already living in extreme poverty by the 1860s. The Russian consul in Rijeka, L. V. Berezin, wrote with

⁵⁹ Ibid., leaf 123.

⁶⁰ Ibid., leaf 43v.

⁶¹ Ibid., leafs 121v.-122.

⁶² Ibid., leaf 148v., 155v.

sympathy about the poverty of the Grenzera and linked it, by the way, as did F. F. Tornau and N. I. Krasnov, with the “local military management system,” which discouraged Grenzera from any engagement in agriculture.⁶³ B. Katalinich went even further, complaining to the Russian Ministry of War of frequent hunger in the border regiments, the ruin of 44,000 farms after the war of 1848-1849 and a double burden from the military and taxes that fell on each Grenzer.⁶⁴ Grenzera’s discontent with their destitute situation was reflected in the demand of their representatives at the Zagreb Sabor in 1861 that the Militärgrenze should be demilitarised precisely because of its poverty.⁶⁵ And it is extremely doubtful that border regiments would be able to adapt to the growing equipment prices without bringing a significant part of the farms to complete and unconditional ruin.

In any case, for the much wealthier Don Host, it was this price rise that became a fatal challenge, one which could not be handled until 1917. Until 1860, Don regiments were, quoting S. F. Nomikosov, a well-known local historian, a “quite non-regular army,” one “that has many weaknesses.”⁶⁶ N. I. Krasnov expressed this idea in a much more clear way, showing what hides behind such euphemistic wording:

The weapons are poor with a half being almost useless, the outfit is poor, and many horses are only fit for the harrow, and are often taken out of the harrow for the tsar’s servant, who in a few months will have to attack on this miserable gelding.

The Don statistician did not conceal the fact that many Cossacks chose cheaper equipment and horses to save money.⁶⁷ And the Ministry of War reacted to the degrading combat efficiency of Cossack regiments, caused by the low equipment quality, with harsher control over accoutrements. Between 1860 and 1890, the government continuously introduced measures, which were increasingly severe and demonstrative, to achieve this goal. In 1899, a delegate from the Khopersky district in one of the local commissions, V. Ya. Biryukov, complained that the officers who were assigned to monitor the serviceability of the equipment used by the privileged regiments⁶⁸ punished the guilty with several week arrests for the slightest defects in their saddle packs, but his complaint was not supported by the authorities: on the contrary, the actions of the officers were recognised as the only appropriate ones.⁶⁹

⁶³ Berezin 1879, p. 348-349.

⁶⁴ RSMHA, fund 428, opis 1, delo 108, leafs 38-77.

⁶⁵ Freidzon 2001, p. 144-145.

⁶⁶ Nomikosov 1884, p. 340.

⁶⁷ Krasnov 1864, p. 228.

⁶⁸ Refers to reserve regiments formed of Cossacks who served their term in the army.

⁶⁹ Maslakovets 1899, p. 5.

And in this changed environment, Cossacks could not use cheap low-quality equipment and could not use the clothes and weapons of their fathers and brothers: each Cossack needed new accoutrements complying with all requirements of the Ministry of War before starting their service. While in 1860, according to the government's official data, a complete set of Cossack accoutrements excluding a horse⁷⁰ cost 33 roubles 38 $\frac{3}{4}$ kopecks,⁷¹ by the 1880s, the price reached 90 roubles 58 kopecks!⁷² In reality, however, this growth was somewhat less significant because Cossacks purchased their equipment and trappings from retailers until 1878, which was much more costly as compared with official procurement prices.⁷³ That is why, in practice, a complete set of accoutrements already cost 83 roubles 55 kopecks in the 1860s,⁷⁴ the price growing, by the 1880s, to 120 roubles 88 kopecks thanks to the introduction of centralised procurement practices from commission agents.⁷⁵ However, the backlash produced by this economy was too heavy: Cossacks were forced to buy all accoutrements in one go without the possibility of breaking the payment into several parts or utilising articles made at home. As a result, delegates from the village communities even appealed for a return to previous practices, despite the inevitable rise in prices, because the one-time payment of such a huge amount was, by the standards of the average household, too “unprofitable for the budget.”⁷⁶ Thus, in just two decades, from 1860 to 1880, according to official data, the price of Cossack accoutrements tripled, and even if in practice it rose by “only” one and a half times, the growth came together with a very disadvantageous change in the procurement system for private owners.

Every year Cossack accoutrements became increasingly expensive, while Cossack land plots, on the contrary, gradually reduced in size due to natural population growth. Already in the 1860s, deputies began raising the issue of land shortage.⁷⁷ In the same decade, another work by N. I. Krasnov noted that despite the apparent prosperity of Cossack households, the number of people who could not pay for their equipment grew every year, and this trend was sooner or later to reach dangerous proportions.⁷⁸ And the Don statistician was proved to be right. Already in the mobilisation of the

⁷⁰ We do not consider the growing prices for horses on the Don, since it was primarily provoked by a local factor – the worst crisis in horse breeding in stanitsas.

⁷¹ Krasnov 1864, p. 231.

⁷² *Protokoly* 1899, p. 33.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁷⁴ Krasnov 1864, p. 235.

⁷⁵ *Protokoly* 1899, p. 33.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁷⁷ SARR, fund 55, opis 1, delo 240, leafs 12-15.

⁷⁸ Krasnov 1864, p. 236.

Don Host before the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the government had to go to enormous expense to ensure the purchase of the necessary equipment for the Cossacks.⁷⁹ According to archival sources, financial aid was needed for one in thirty eight people of the 45,000 Cossacks mobilised.⁸⁰ It may seem that this percentage of insolvent Cossacks was insignificant, but nothing of the kind was recorded in the previous mobilisations of the Don Host, and Ataman N. I. Krasnokutsky considered this to be a very disturbing sign.⁸¹ But the Ministry of War took almost no steps, limiting them to the extremely unfortunate proposal to introduce the purchase of accoutrements by Cossacks from commission agents. And finally, by the early twentieth century, the actual costs for a Cossack to purchase a horse and accoutrements reached 300 roubles, and government aid was necessary for one in six Cossacks!⁸²

By the start of the twentieth century, the ruin of Cossacks, caused by the unbearable hardships of military service, swept the Don, just half a century later than the *Militärgrenze* suffered a similar fate. While surrounding governorates, despite their own problems, became wealthier over time, the Don Host Oblast faced poverty. In 1899, even opponents of the privileges granted to Don Cossacks agreed with a deputy from the Khopersky district nobility, P. G. Mordvintsev, who wrote: “While in 1870, the Host administration would have seemed unlucky to find a poor family among prosperous households, in twenty years they will be even less likely, perhaps, to find any wealthy Cossack lost among the poor ones.”⁸³ The Ministry of War had to agree to an unparalleled and unprecedented measure by beginning to pay an allowance of 100 roubles to each Cossack who served in the military.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, only 25 years previously, in 1875, the Minister of War, D. A. Milyutin, had vehemently opposed the introduction of such benefits, arguing that “the current order of serving in the military” “stood fast until each Cossack considered it unprofitable and reprehensible to equip himself for military service at someone else’s expense.” For this reason, according to the Minister, introducing financial support to impoverished Cossacks to buy accoutrements would be a clear step towards the abolition of the existing system of Cossack troops.⁸⁵ However, by 1899, the government no longer had a choice. A. A. Chigrintsev, the Prosecutor of Novochoerkassk, described the situation that had developed by that time in Cossack villages: “In

⁷⁹ Nomikosov 1884, p. 349.

⁸⁰ MDRNL, fund 1055, delo 24, leaf 13v.

⁸¹ SARR, fund 46, opis 1, delo 1434, leafs 1-2.

⁸² MDRNL, fund 1055, delo 24, leafs 12v.-14.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, leaf 8r.-v.

⁸⁴ Krasnov 1909, p. 484.

⁸⁵ MDRNL, fund 1055, delo 65, leaf 11v.

peacetime, general conscription completely ruins Cossacks and puts their families in extremely difficult conditions.” Analysing the situation in some Cossack families, he came to the conclusion that buying accoutrements for the service ruined them permanently and drove them into such a plight that they hardly had any possible ways out.⁸⁶

So, by the mid-nineteenth century, non-regular troops of the classical type, such as Russian Cossacks and Austrian Grenzers, were doomed. No military successes and combat effectiveness could save them as the gravest danger came from entirely the other side, from the exceptional economic inefficiency. Even if the government agreed to tolerate a backlog in the development of rich and fertile areas, the people living there themselves could not fully perform their former functions – the accoutrements for the military service became too costly and it was too difficult for an ordinary family to earn such money, and even the earlier, most successful Don Host began to drift into abject poverty by the 1890s. And the *Militärgrenze*, which was already impoverished by the 1860s in our opinion, had no alternatives at all because the independent purchase of high-quality accoutrements would quickly become impossible for the Grenzers. Both the Russian and Austrian war ministries generally understood this situation. F. F. Tornau wrote as early as 1864 that:

The Austrian government understands the losses it incurs in the *Militärgrenze*, but hesitates over what measures to adopt that can remedy them. [...] The inability to attract new settlers to the border who are willing to assume the military service duties of Grenzers, the inconvenience of creating a new class of commoners near the existing population who are not part of the general system, and the desire to preserve the military establishment which it raised with great care over one and a half centuries have put it in this case in a most difficult situation.⁸⁷

In Russia, D. A. Milyutin put it in an even more definite way: “The Ministry should not forget that Cossack territories are not military camps, but parts of the state that have the full right to enjoy the benefits of civil and economic development, along with other parts of the Empire.”⁸⁸

However, before proceeding to the analysis of the solutions for the emerging crisis which were proposed for Cossack troops and the *Militärgrenze* in the 1860s, we would like to provide a brief review of some of the non-economic problems faced by both the Cossacks and Grenzers in this decade. The most essential problem was the combat degradation of Grenzer and Cossack regiments, which clearly manifested itself in the armed

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, delo 24, leafs 12v.-13.

⁸⁷ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leafs 40-41.

⁸⁸ Milyutin 1999, p. 262-263.

conflicts of the 1850s. F. F. Tornau in his memoirs gave a very negative assessment of the combat qualities of the Grenzers.⁸⁹ B. Katalinich, who agreed that the soldiers of the border regiments fought badly in the Austrian army, insisted on linking this with their reluctance to die for the emperor.⁹⁰ Modern Russian historians are inclined to accept the position of the Austrian adventurer, rather than that of the Russian intelligence officer.⁹¹ But even the text by B. Katalinich clearly indicates that the reasons for the degradation in the Grenzers' combat efficiency should not be reduced only to the decline in their morale. The adventurer acknowledged that manoeuvres on the Militärgrenze did not include drilling their interaction with the regular army, that these manoeuvres themselves lasted no longer than 75 days a year, that for the rest of the time even the soldiers of combatant units were dismissed to their homes, and, finally, that in wartime Grenzer battalions often had a consolidated character, their officers not always knowing their subordinates.⁹² Undoubtedly, all this had not prevented border regiments from showing their best in previous wars. But these times were in the past, never to return, and now inadequately trained and insufficiently disciplined units had dubious combat skills. And representatives of the Austrian generals doubted not only the morale of the Grenzers, but also their ability to catch up with regular units in "marching," "disciplinary" and "combat" achievements.⁹³

A similar situation existed in Cossack troops. Until the mid-1860s, there was no provision for pre-marching training in them in principle, since it was supposed that Cossacks would be trained in operating units. Unfortunately, this led to sad results in practice. I. I. Krasnov, father of N. I. Krasnov, the hero of the Crimean and Caucasian Wars, complained that such "training" was virtually useless: it took at least two years to train a good mounted soldier, and it was not until the third year of service that young recruits became really useful, after which they were dismissed and went home for a privileged leave. This privileged leave lasted two or three years in which Cossacks lost many of the acquired skills, and after a second conscription he had to learn anew.⁹⁴ Therefore, it is hardly surprising that poorly trained Cossack regiments lost so much of their combat efficiency that Russian officers widely entertained an opinion as to the lack of "combat advantages of non-regular light cavalry."⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Tornau 1897, p. 431.

⁹⁰ RSMHA, fund 428, opis 1, delo 108, leafs 38-77.

⁹¹ Freidzon 2001, p. 145.

⁹² RSMHA, fund 428, opis 1, delo 108, leafs 38-77.

⁹³ Ibid., fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leaf 41r-v.

⁹⁴ Krasnov 1864, p. 229.

⁹⁵ Karasev 1896, p. 589.

In this context, ideas calling for the replacement of numerous but poorly trained masses of non-regulars to quantitatively smaller but much more organised regular parts sounded more and more distinctively. F. F. Tornau reported to Saint Petersburg that Militärgrenze opponents believe that it would be possible to deploy 18,000 soldiers of line regiments, who would have a “decisive advantage over the Frontier police” of 72,793 Grenzern.⁹⁶ In Russia, N. A. Maslakovets argued that the Orenburg army, which consisted of 12 cavalry regiments, 3 horse batteries and 6 foot battalions, could successfully be replaced by a detachment of regular troops comprising a four-regiment cavalry division, an artillery brigade and two separate battalions.⁹⁷

But at this time, the governments of Russia and Austria faced another much more dangerous problem, even though it was less obvious to the Cossacks and Grenzern themselves. The once loyal Cossack troops and the faithful Militärgrenze could no longer be relied upon. It is meaningful that it was precisely in this decade that B. Katalinich arrived in Saint Petersburg not with a proposal to organise the resettlement of his fellow Grenzern to the Russian Empire, a traditional initiative of Yugoslav pro-Russian leaders. (The most well-known attempt to put this idea into practice was undertaken in the eighteenth century by Elizaveta Petrovna,⁹⁸ but in the mid-nineteenth century, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs also allocated land for Yugoslav colonists, which was registered in the fund of M. F. Raevsky.⁹⁹) The expectations of the Austrian adventurer extended much further: as we wrote above, he planned to incite the Militärgrenze to rebellion and saw himself among the key figures of this uprising. Even F. F. Tornau, who was more cautious and sympathetic to the House of Habsburg, wrote about the Grenzern that “the weapons that the Austrian government gave into their hands can at this very minute be turned against it.”¹⁰⁰ However, a little later the Russian agent in Vienna clarified that discontent in the border regiments “has been of the most passive character” so far, but this passive murmur “conceals a definite future danger.”¹⁰¹ The oldest and largest Cossack troop on the Don lived through a hardly better situation. D. A. Milyutin personally expressed fears that the government would have to send regular regiments in

⁹⁶ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leafs 42-43v.

⁹⁷ MDRNL, fund 748, delo 3, leaf 1.

⁹⁸ Kirpichonok 2007, p. 23-35.

⁹⁹ MDRNL, fund 627.

¹⁰⁰ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leaf 44v.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., leaf 45.

order to suppress the impending indignation of Don Cossacks.¹⁰² The opponents of the government enjoyed total support in stanitsas.¹⁰³

An attempt to analyse the reasons for such discontent of Grenzlers and Cossacks would make an individual study, and a detailed analysis of them would require at least a paper. We will only point out that both people who lived in the Don Host Oblast and those who lived on the Militärgrenze believed that they were being deceived. They served their empires for many years, shed their blood in numerous wars, but did their governments reward them for these feats? Cossacks and Grenzlers believed that they had simply been used for government purposes in recent decades and were often deceived, while their traditional privileges were violated. We should again give the floor to their contemporary, Kh. I. Popov, who with undisguised anger wrote about efforts to engage “Cossack” deputies in taking part in government commissions and committees so that the decisions of these bodies might subsequently be made according to the will of Don Cossacks. In indignation, the Don author noted that such committees were “really made up of Cossacks, but the appointments were chosen by the administrative authorities, they do not have the right to vote and are obliged to act as instructed by their chairman.”¹⁰⁴ Proposals put forward by these committees during their sessions were allowed to be voiced by private individuals; however, in practice, there was no use in it. Government officials usually “did not pay attention to private comments,” considering them “inefficient.”¹⁰⁵ And in the end, Kh. I. Popov delivered an angry philippic addressed to the Ministry of War: “They should not *insult people* [italics added by authors] so imprudently in many ways, telling them to their faces that it participates in public affairs through its committee bodies, while in fact there are no committees.”¹⁰⁶ But, unfortunately, mistakes had already been made, with the first of them having been committed half a century earlier:

The Don has not yet forgotten that after the first committee of the twenties its chairman, Chernyshev, subsequently pinned the blame for all shortcomings and incongruities in the committee’s work to mute committee members from the natives (before he drove away those of them whose opinion did not please him).¹⁰⁷

By the 1860s, the Cossacks had learned their lesson, and no longer trusted the Ministry of War: “Time and kind people well taught Cossacks to identify

¹⁰² Volvenko 2014a, p. 16.

¹⁰³ Karasev 1900, p. 167-174.

¹⁰⁴ SARR, fund 55, opis 1, delo 34, leaf 1v.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., leaf 2.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., leaf 2v.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

their friends and enemies – no matter what they pretend to be, no matter what phrases they hide behind.”¹⁰⁸

The reasons of the *Militärgrenze* for some kind of opposition between the people and power were even more definite. Already F. F. Tornau had said that Vienna could not count on the undivided loyalty of border regiments after “they were so disappointed in their expectations following 1848.”¹⁰⁹ He meant the fact, generally known in the *Militärgrenze* historiography, according to which after they took part in quelling revolutions in Italy and Hungary, the *Grenzers* expected improvements in their situation. “The Great National Assembly,” the congress of Croatian public figures in 1848, proclaimed Josip Jelačić, a *Grenzer* colonel, loyal to the House of Habsburg, the Ban (administrator) of Croatia, but at the same time demanded the integration of the *Militärgrenze* to civil Croatia and an expansion of the use of the Croatian language. The imperial authorities took certain steps to meet the demands of the discontented *Grenzers* and even for the first time allowed delegates from border regiments to take part in the Croatian Sabor. In these circumstances, the *Grenzers* supported Vienna and mounted a large army against Hungarian rebels, despite the fact that many battalions of border regiments were already engaged in combat in Italy. However, after the revolutions were put down, the demands of The Great National Assembly were never fulfilled, and the *Militärgrenze* remained a special territory that did not belong to civil Croatia.¹¹⁰ However, grievances against the Austrian monarchy were not limited to these failures. B. Katalinich attached greater importance to the fact that “the germanisation of the *Militärgrenze* was carried out by the Austrian government with special care, and it turned its primary attention to this evidently unattainable goal.”¹¹¹ This opinion was shared by F. F. Tornau as well who wrote in 1864 that the Austrian policy adopted in recent years had “provoked the open resistance of Slavic provinces which see in it the loss of their ancient rights and the destruction of their national independence for the benefit of the German element,” and that in the case of a new insurrection in Hungary, the border regiments might stand with the insurgents, rather than with the government.¹¹²

Why, then, did the government take and return nothing, generally retaining the old order contrary, both regarding Cossack troops and on the *Militärgrenze*, to the will of the local population? As for the Russian case, we can give an exact answer to this question. In February 1836, when it became

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, leaf 3.

¹⁰⁹ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leaf 43v.

¹¹⁰ Freidzon 2001, p. 113-119.

¹¹¹ RSMHA, fund 428, opis 1, delo 108, leafs 38-77.

¹¹² RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leafs 44v.-45.

clear that Don Cossacks were reacting very negatively to the Regulations on the Don Host,¹¹³ which was handed down from above, Nicholas I had a series of meetings with the new ataman who was to leave for the Don, M. G. Vlasov. The emperor did not try to conceal his thoughts, and the adjutant of the ataman, A. P. Chebotarev, preserved them for future generations.

I love Cossacks, *but I would not want to them to stop being Cossacks: it is necessary that no reform should reach the Don either in rights, in customs, or in the service itself* [italics added by authors]. Let Cossacks remain the glorious Cossacks of the Patriotic War of 1812.¹¹⁴

The emperor believed that the “glorious Cossacks” were his devoted servants who did not have the right to their own opinion: The monarch’s rage was caused by a weak resemblance even to the opposition on the Don, which was embodied in the fact that many generals and nobles avoided being personally present at the promulgation of the Regulations on the Don Host. And now Nicholas I required that the new ataman should “take them [the Cossacks] into his hands, lead them with an iron hand,” and especially emphasised that the general should fight against enlightenment: “You already have a lot of scientists and scholars, you do not want to have any more, but you should strive for more old goodness and old simplicity.”¹¹⁵

We do not know what Franz Joseph thought of the Grenzern, but in 1864 F. F. Tornau reported to Saint Petersburg that the decisive argument against the immediate reform of the Militärgrenze was the fear of “disturbing the institution that serves as a sure stronghold against her [Hungary’s] aspirations to withdraw from the Empire and annex the surrounding people of Slavic origin.”¹¹⁶ Even if in the 1860s some of the Austrian generals considered border regiments a helpful institution, is it necessary to speak of the previous decade? Following 1848, the world military press really appreciated the Grenzern,¹¹⁷ and they formed a considerable portion of the Austrian army (1/8, according to calculations by F. F. Tornau),¹¹⁸ and at the same time they were maintained at the expense of internal funds of the Militärgrenze.¹¹⁹ Was it worth transforming such a seemingly efficient military institution, “raised with great care over one and a half centuries”?¹²⁰

We approach the idea that we perceive to be particularly important for our paper. By the 1860s, both the Cossacks and Grenzern turned out to be

¹¹³ The fundamental document regulating all aspects of life of the Don Cossackdom.

¹¹⁴ Volvenko 2015, p. 109.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 108-109.

¹¹⁶ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leafs 41v.-42.

¹¹⁷ Wickede 1859, p. 677.

¹¹⁸ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leaf 42.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, leafs 42-43.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, leaf 40.

held hostage to past successes, elements of the archaic past in a changed world. It was not their fault. Both the Russian and Austrian governments, impressed by the past achievements of Grenzer and Cossack regiments, missed the ideal point in time for their reorganisation, as they vainly hoped that the institution of non-regular troops, very effective in the Napoleonic epoch, would remain the same in future. Senior officials were exceptionally cautious even with regards to local individual transformations on the *Militärgrenze* and in the Don Host Oblast, although the inhabitants of these territories faced many hardships in addition to those mentioned above. For example, incompetence and a preference for written law over local traditions were widespread among officials on the Don,¹²¹ while corruption was flourishing in Grenzer regiments.¹²² Don Cossacks complained that the number of schools was inadequate, and the opening of new ones was hampered by the lengthy approvals required and other red tape,¹²³ and more numerous schools on the *Militärgrenze* suffered from poverty and a lack of qualified teachers.¹²⁴ But the imperial authorities, who looked at the Cossacks and Grenzers first and foremost as military forces which were superb without any reforms, did not rush to deal with their problems, which gave birth to a growing distrust among the local population of the central administration. And by the end of 1850, these problems reached such a scale that it was impossible to ignore them any longer. N. I. Krasnov proved a decade later that the territories of military settlers were completely excluded from normal economic development, and this was unacceptable for European states of the second half of the nineteenth century. And this was not the only fatal problem of the non-regular troops. We demonstrated in our paper that the traditional training of Cossacks and Grenzers had already become unequal to that of regular armies, and units consisting of border regiments were untrustworthy because of the growing discontent with government policies.

And the 1860s became a time of efforts to handle the apparently looming crisis of Russian and Austrian non-regulars. We will not analyse each reform project proposed at this time, because these proposals were very numerous and were often intended to solve individual problems of the *Militärgrenze* and Russian Cossack troops rather than systemic issues. Instead, we once again turn to the reports of F. F. Tornau to Saint Petersburg, which conditionally divided participants in debates on the future of border regiments into two groups. One side, according to the Russian military agent, was represented by the “advocates of the existing system,” who believed it to

¹²¹ Novitsky 1991, p. 52-55.

¹²² RSMHA, fund 428, opis 1, delo 108, leafs 38-77.

¹²³ Karasev 1896, p. 580-581.

¹²⁴ Berezin 1879, p. 344-345.

be a crucial fact that, with all its shortcomings, the *Militärgrenze* made it possible to military contingent from a population of 1 million which in other parts of the empire would be gathered from 4 to 5 million inhabitants.¹²⁵ Accordingly, although the need for a major reform of the *Militärgrenze* was recognised by everyone,¹²⁶ this group of the Austrian generals thought that it was necessary to reform the border regiments, preserving their best qualities. The other side included “people dissatisfied with the organisation of the *Militärgrenze*.” They argued that the non-regular organisation of the *Grenzern* had in principle become obsolete, and that they should be transferred to a civilian status.¹²⁷

Our first acquaintance with the report by F. F. Tornau had already surprised us by how much the ideas of the Austrian supporters and opponents of preserving the border regiments resembled the ideas of Russian *Kazakomans* and Progressists.¹²⁸ The ideologist of the former of the two “parties,” A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov, acknowledged the need to “change some moth-eaten regulations” in Cossack troops, and even drew up his programme to reform Don Cossacks, but at the same time he underscored in every way how “premature, if not dangerous, all changes by the government to the basic principles of the [Don] Host” were.¹²⁹ As for the main Progressist idea, it, strangely enough, was most precisely formulated by their ideological opponent, Ataman of the Ural Host, A. D. Stolypin: “If the circumstances that gave birth to Cossacks have ceased to exist, Cossacks are to tumble down, and what is to tumble down should not be supported by artificial means.”¹³⁰

With all the diversity of specific projects, both in Russia and Austria, only two main solutions for the emerging crisis were proposed. Russian *Kazakomans* and Austrian “advocates of the existing system” believed that it was necessary to upgrade Cossack troops and the *Militärgrenze* and integrate them into the system of modern states and modern armies, preserving, if possible, traditional institutions. Austrian “people discontented with the organisation of the *Militärgrenze*” and Russian Progressists, on the contrary, believed that the Cossacks and *Grenzern* should be merged with the rest of the population of their empires, and that reforms slowing down this process only prolonged the agony of the obsolete military settlements. The future showed that the Progressist were right in this dispute.

¹²⁵ RSMHA, fund 330, opis 10, delo 290, leaf 42r.-v.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, leafs 40-42.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, leafs 43v.-44.

¹²⁸ Peretyatko 2016b, p. 87.

¹²⁹ Karasev 1896, p. 579-585.

¹³⁰ St. 1861, p. 202.

The fact is that, beginning in the 1870s, the paths of Russian Cossacks and the Austrian *Militärgrenze*, very similar in the previous two decades, increasingly diverged. We wrote above that in the end the Austrian (more precisely, already Austro-Hungarian) authorities made up their mind to initiate the demilitarisation of the *Militärgrenze*, and in 1871 actually launched this process. The Russian Ministry of War, on the contrary, over time abandoned its most radical ideas, and tried to combine the economic and military modernisation of Cossack troops.¹³¹ However, the outcome of these attempts was not in the least satisfactory. Orenburg Ataman, N. A. Maslakovets, complained in 1889 that the weakening control of the military authorities over the civil life of the Cossacks failed not only to enrich *stanitsas*, but led to their ruin:

It turned out to be disastrous to extend the regulatory framework of the Empire's rural areas management to Cossack troops. Instead of the old order of managing the affairs of the *stanitsa* economy under the control of the military administration, they received the right to public self-government. [...] Cossacks, who exercised the right to transfer land plots for cultivation to third parties, and having handed over those plots for rather long periods and often for low rent, found themselves to have no land and no money.¹³²

On the other hand, the tasks of the military administration, which lost its leverage over *stanitsas*, became much more complicated:

All requirements imposed by them [the military authorities] on Cossacks can eventually be properly complied with provided there is the assistance and direct involvement of the *uezd* police, that is, the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.¹³³

N. A. Maslakovets had an opinion (which was, however, somewhat too pessimistic, in our opinion) that the modernisation proposed by the government made Cossack troops incapable in military and economic aspects: the reforms “almost brought to the verge of collapse the entire structure of their [Cossack troops] previous progression in the spirit of devotion of the Cossack population,”¹³⁴ and at the same time it took the already bad economic situation to the point where “the population was literally starving, livestock was killed for the want of fodder!”¹³⁵

And gradually the Russian Ministry of War rejected attempts to accelerate the economic development of Cossack regions from above and channelled its efforts into ensuring the maximum combat efficiency of the

¹³¹ Peretyatko 2014, p. 230.

¹³² MDRNL, fund 1055, delo 104, leafs 6v-7v.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, leaf 5v.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, leaf 5.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, leaf 9.

units mounted by their territories, not by introducing deep changes, but by increasing the interference of the military authorities in peaceful life.¹³⁶ In fact, this was a return to the policy that led the Cossacks and Grenziers to the precarious state of the 1860s, but the Russian government failed to realise this. As once Nicholas I and Franz Joseph had, Alexander III and Nicholas II tried to retain the glorious non-regular armies of the past epoch, by making do with the absolute minimum of required reforms and addressing only the most obvious issues. And we would like to finish the main part of our paper with an extensive excerpt from a private letter of A. A. Chigrintsev to N. A. Maslakovets, where the Novocherkassk prosecutor made good use of the example of the Don Cossacks to illustrate how hopeless was the very idea of reforming non-regular troops without changing the general system of their service.

The Don Oblast continues to be a military camp that does not fight in a war, but is always prepared for it; every year thousands of strong, healthy workers are torn from peaceful labour, which alone ensures their well-being, and every year, to buy accoutrements for them, Cossacks incur heavy expenses. In the interests of a war, the authorities are trying to maintain a special spirit in Cossacks, so that they do not lose their combat qualities, and the Cossack continues to primarily view himself as a warrior, not as a farmer or artisan. [...] If the armed peace brings entire states almost to bankruptcy, how hard it is for the Don Oblast! Perhaps I am mistaken, although no one has proved this to me so far, but I firmly believe that as long as the Don Oblast remains a military camp, we can speak about serious improvements to its material well-being, but we cannot achieve them. *To do this, it is necessary to change the living conditions and to re-educate the entire Cossack population* [italics added by authors].¹³⁷

Conclusions

We understand that our paper does not contain a comprehensive analysis of the similarity that was evidently visible between the Militärgrenze and Cossack troops in the 1860s. Many interesting and important subjects were placed entirely beyond the scope of our research, for example, a comparison of particular draft reforms proposed by Austrian and Russian officers to tackle similar issues. However, the review provided was sufficient to understand that “detailed comparison” of Cossacks and Grenziers actually, as A. Kappeler suggests, enables us to look at the history of border communities and non-regular troops from a different perspective and discover patterns that previously have not attracted scientific attention. Moreover, as often happens, the Austrian historian had predecessors of whose existence he was not even aware – a century and a half before him the leading Don statistician

¹³⁶ Peretyatko 2014, p. 230-231.

¹³⁷ MDRNL, fund 1055, delo 24, leaf 2r-v.

of his time, N. I. Krasnov, endeavoured to carry out such a “detailed comparison,” although in the end his work was buried in the depths of Russian military archives.

However, historians, who set themselves a goal to compare the development of Austrian Grenzers and Russian Cossacks, very quickly encounter the risk of mixing up myths and reality and of coming to believe in false historiographical constructs created by inadequately informed authors. The main text of our paper reviewed such constructs, characteristic of Russian texts on the *Militärgrenze*. The unreliable nature of some of them is obvious. For example, it is enough to have a general look at the history of border regiments to refute the opinion of A. P. Skorik and R. G. Tikidzhyan that it was impossible for people who lived in the areas to “carry on a peaceful economy.” However, refuting other statements requires further investigation in the Russian archives as only this step helped us to confirm that A. A. Volvenko gives erroneous interpretations of some texts by F. F. Tornau and N. I. Krasnov, assuming that the experience of the Austrian reforms on the *Militärgrenze* had been used in Russia to transform Cossack troops in the 1860s. But Russian texts on Cossacks contain an even greater number of myths and false historiographical constructs. For example, conservative minded authors of the late nineteenth century were eager in every possible way to downplay the scale of discontent with government reforms in Cossack troops in the 1860s, and represent these reforms as the logical development of the government’s policy in the previous decades.¹³⁸ Therefore, as we wrote above, the author who ventures to seriously explore the similarities and differences between the Cossacks and Grenzers will have to have a good command of the history of both, and analyse primary sources in addition to the works of later authors; otherwise their work will be devoted to comparing one actually existing military class with a mythologised image of the other.

And it is the situation of the 1860s, when both Cossack troops and the *Militärgrenze* were very far from the textbook image of loyal defenders of the emperor and faith, which is often drawn by some historians. Military successes of past years played a fatal role. The governments of the Russian and Austrian Empires adopted an extremely cautious approach to reforms for non-regular troops, and Nicholas I even openly said to one of the Don Atamans that he wanted to retain the Cossacks as the “glorious Cossacks of the Patriotic War of 1812.” But the world around rapidly moved forward, and N. I. Krasnov had showed as early as the 1860s that excluding the territories of non-regular troops from the normal economic development was not balanced by contingents mounted by them. And this was only one of many problems faced by the Cossacks and Grenzers. Their military training systems

¹³⁸ Nomikosov 1884, p. 48-49.

became increasingly obsolete compared to those of the regular armies, and once excellent units already had a questionable combat value in the opinion of many officers. Finally, the government's reluctance to handle the problems that the Cossack and Militärgrenze areas were beset with caused discontent among the local populations, which reached a dangerous scope in the 1860s.

Similar problems gave rise to similar solutions – both in Russia and in Austria, two “parties” fought each other by offering totally opposite scenarios for the further development of non-regular troops. On the one hand, there were advocates who promoted the modernisation of the existing order and its integration into the modern army and state system, and on the other hand, they were opposed by people who urged the transfer of the Grenzlers and Cossacks into a civilian status and the complete elimination of these archaic and semi-feudal institutions. And, although the empires chose different ways out of the situation (the Russian Ministry of War preferred to upgrade the Cossack class, while the Austrian Ministry opted to disband the Militärgrenze), this similarity suggests that the crises of the Cossacks and Grenzlers of the 1860s had not only local and situational reasons, but also universal root causes, generated by processes characterising non-regular troops at the time. The most important and most general processes were identified by N. I. Krasnov, while others, which are specific to conservative Eastern European monarchies in the post-Napoleonic era, were determined by us. However, we believe that we only slightly tapped into a promising area of research, a “detailed comparison of the Cossacks” and Grenzlers, which over time, according to A. Kappeler's prediction, will “further explain the phenomenon of the border communities in general and in particular the history of the Cossacks.”

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- AB** - Analele Buzăului. Muzeul Județean Buzău.
- Academe** - Academe. The American Association of University Professors. Washington.
- ACNLU** - Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Upsaliensis. Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies (Uppsala 2009). Leiden.
- ActaHASH** - Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. Budapest.
- ActaMN** - Acta Musei Napocensis. Muzeul de Istorie a Transilvaniei. Cluj-Napoca.
- AÉ** - Archaeologiai Értesítő a Magyar régészeti, művésztörténeti és éremtani társulat tudományos folyóirata. Budapest.
- AI** - Anale de Istorie. Institutul de Studii Istorice și Social-Politice de pe lângă CC al PCR. București.
- AIAC** - Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj-Napoca.
- AIIAI/AIIX** - Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol” Iași (din 1990 Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol” Iași).
- AIIN** - Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională. Cluj, Sibiu.
- Alba-Iulia** - Alba-Iulia. Alba Iulia.
- AM** - Arheologia Moldovei. Institutul de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol” Iași.
- AnB** - Analele Banatului (serie nouă). Muzeul Național al Banatului. Timișoara.
- Antik Tanulmányok** - Antik Tanulmányok. Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest.
- AO** - Arhivele Olteniei (serie nouă). Institutul de Cercetări Socio-Umane. Craiova.
- Apulum** - Apulum. Acta Musei Apulensis. Muzeul Național al Unirii Alba Iulia.
- ArhSom** - Arhiva Someșană. Revistă istorică-culturală. Năsăud.
- ArhMed** - Arheologia Medievală. Reșița, Cluj-Napoca.
- Astra Salvensis** - Astra Salvensis. Cercul Salva al ASTRA. Salva.
- AT** - Arhivele totalitarismului. Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului. Academia Română. București.
- AUASH** - Annales Universitatis Apulensis. Series Historica. Universitatea „1 Decembrie 1918” din Alba Iulia.
- AUMCS** - Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej. Lublin.

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AUS	- Acta Universitatis Szegediensis De Attila József Nominatae. Acta Historiae Litterarum Hungaricarum. A József Attila Tudományegyetem-Bölcsészettudományi Kar. Szeged.
AVSL	- Archiv des Vereins für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde. Sibiu.
Banatica	- Banatica. Muzeul de Istorie al Județului Caraș-Severin. Reșița.
BAR	- British Archaeological Reports (International Series). Oxford.
BC	- Biblioteca și cercetarea. Cluj-Napoca.
BCȘS	- Buletinul Cercurilor Științifice Studentești. Universitatea „1 Decembrie 1918” din Alba Iulia.
BHAB	- Bibliotheca Historica et Archaeologica Banatica. Muzeul Banatului Timișoara.
Boabe de grâu	- Boabe de grâu. Revistă de cultură. București.
Brukenthal	- Brukenthal. Acta Musei. Muzeul Național Brukenthal. Sibiu.
București	- București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie. Muzeul Municipiului București.
Bylye Gody	- Bylye Gody. International Network Center for Fundamental and Applied Research. Washington.
Caietele CNSAS	- Caietele CNSAS. Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității. București.
CB	- Călăuza bibliotecarului. Biblioteca Centrală de Stat București.
CBAstra	- Conferințele Bibliotecii Astra. Biblioteca Județeană Astra. Sibiu.
Cărți românești	- Cărți românești.
CCA	- Cronica cercetărilor arheologice. cIMeC. București.
CEHF	- Cahiers d'Études Hongroises et Finlandaises. Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3.
CollMed	- Collegium Mediense. Comunicări științifice. Colegiul Tehnic „Mediense” Mediaș.
Colloquia	- Colloquia. Journal of Central European History. Institutul de Studii Central-Europene al Facultății de Istorie și Filosofie a Universității „Babeș-Bolyai” Cluj-Napoca.
ComȘtMediaș	- Comunicări Științifice. Mediaș (este continuată de CollMed).
Contimporanul	- Contimporanul. Revistă de avangardă, cu program constructivist. București.
Corviniana	- Corviniana. Acta Musei Corvinensis. Muzeul Castelului Corvineștilor.
Cumidava	- Cumidava. Muzeul Județean de Istorie Brașov.

Țitatel	- Țitatel. Matica slovenská. Martin.
Discobolul	- Discobolul. Revistă de cultură. Uniunea Scriitorilor din România. Alba Iulia.
Drobeta	- Drobeta. Seria Etnografie. Muzeul Regiunii Porților de Fier. Drobeta-Turnu Severin.
Drobeta. Artă Plastică	- Drobeta. Seria Artă Plastică. Muzeul Regiunii Porților de Fier. Drobeta-Turnu Severin.
eClassica	- eClassica. Centro des Estudos Clássicos. Lisabona.
EF	- Einband-Forschung, Informationsblatt des Arbeitskreises für die Erfassung, Erschliessung und Erhaltung Historischer Bucheinbände (AEB). Berlin.
EJCE	- European Journal of Contemporary Education. Academic Publishing House Researcher. Bratislava.
EJST	- European Journal of Science and Theology. Gheorghe Asachi Technical University of Jassy.
EO	- Etnograficheskoye obozreniye. Institut etnologii i antropologii RAN. Moskva.
EphNap	- Ephemeris Napocensis. Institutul de Arheologie și Istoria Artei Cluj-Napoca.
EPK	- Egyetemes Philologiai Közlöny. Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest.
ER	- Exportgut Reformation. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Göttingen.
ESTuar	- ESTuar. Online. București.
Familia	- Familia (seria I: 1865-1906). Oradea.
FI	- File de Istorie. Muzeul de Istorie Bistrița (continuată de RB).
FM	- Europäische Zeitschrift für Mineralogie, Kristallographie, Petrologie, Geochemie und Lagerstättenkunde. Deutschen Mineralogischen Gesellschaft. Stuttgart.
Folklore	- Folklore. Centre de Documentation et le Musée Audois des Arts et Traditions populaires. Carcassonne. Montpellier.
Gazeta ilustrată	- Gazeta ilustrată. Literară. Politică. Economică. Socială. Cluj.
GeoJournal	- GeoJournal. Spatially Integrated Social Sciences and Humanities. Springer Science and Business Media (Netherlands).
GT	- Geographia Technica. Geographia Technica Association. Cluj University Press. Cluj-Napoca.
HE	- Historia Ecclesiastica. Prešovská univerzita. Prešov.
HHCT	- History and Historians in the Context of the Time. Academic Publishing House Researcher. Bratislava.

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- HL** - Humanistica Lovaniensia. Journal of Neo-Latin Studies. Seminarium Philologiae Humanisticae. Leuven.
- HQ** - The Hungarian Quarterly. The Hungarian Quarterly Society. Budapest.
- HS** - Historické štúdie. Historický ústav slovenskej akadémie vied. Bratislava.
- Hyphen** - Hyphen. A Journal of Melitensia and the Humanities. The New Lyceum (Arts), Msida, Malta.
- IJCS** - International Journal of Conservation Science. Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Jassy.
- IJHCS** - International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies. University of Gafsa.
- INT** - Istoriya nauki i tekhniki. Izdatel'stvo „Reaktiv”. Ufa.
- IV** - Istoricheskii vestnik. Moskva.
- IS** - Izvestiya Samarskogo tsentra Rossiiskoi akademii nauk. Samara.
- IYZGU** - Izvestiya Yugo-Zapadnogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Yugo-Zapadnyi gosudarstvennyi universitet. Kursk.
- Izvestiya ANKSSR** - Izvestiya Akademii Nauk Kazakhskoy Sovetskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Respubliki. Seriya obshchestvennykh nauk. Alma-Ata.
- Îndrumător bisericesc** - Îndrumător bisericesc misionar și patriotic. Episcopia Aradului. Arad.
- Îndrumător pastoral** - Îndrumător pastoral. Episcopia Ortodoxă Română de Alba Iulia.
- JBS** - The Journal of Baroque Studies. International Institute for Baroque Studies at the University of Malta.
- JIA** - Journal of International Affairs. School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. New York.
- JSRI** - Journal for the Study of Religions & Ideologies. The Academic Society for the Research of Religions and Ideologies. Cluj-Napoca.
- Kniha** - Kniha. Matica slovenská. Martin.
- Knižničný zborník** - Knižničný zborník. Matica slovenská. Martin.
- LAR** - Literatură și artă română. Idei, simțire, formă. București.

Limba română	- Limba română. Institutul de Lingvistică al Academiei Române „Iorgu Iordan - Al. Rosetti”. București.
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Magyar Nyelvőr	- Magyar Nyelvőr. A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Nyelvtudományi Intézet. Budapest.
Magyarország	- Magyarország. Budapest.
MCA	- Materiale și cercetări arheologice. București.
ME	- Memoria Ethnologica. Centrul Județean pentru Conservarea și Promovarea Culturii Tradiționale Maramureș. Baia Mare.
MH	- Melita Historica. Malta Historical Society.
MK	- Magyar Könyvszemle. Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Budapest. Irodalomtudományi Intézet Országos Széchényi Könyvtár Budapest.
MKS	- Magyar Könyv-Szemle. A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia - Irodalomtudományi Intézet. Budapest.
MLN	- Modern Language Notes. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore.
MN	- Muzeul Național. Muzeul Național de Istorie a României. București.
MP	- Magyar Pedagógia. A Magyar Pedagógiai Társaság. Budapest.
Muzeum	- Muzeum. Muzejní a vlastivedná práce. National Museum. Prague.
NLWJ	- The National Library of Wales Journal. The National Library of Wales. Aberystwyth.
Noema	- Noema. Comitetul Român de Istoria și Filosofia Științei și Tehnicii. București.
NNI	- Novaya i noveishaya istoriya. Rossiiskaya akademiya nauk. Moskva.
NP	- Novoe proshloe. Yuzhnyi federal'nyi universitet. Rostov-na-Donu.
NS	- Nasledie i sovremennost'. Rossiyskiy nauchno-issledovatel'skiy institut kul'turnogo i prirodnogo naslediya im. D. S. Likhacheva. Moskva.
NVBU	- Nauchnye vedomosti Belgorodskogo universiteta. Seriya Istoriya. Politologiya. Ekonomika. Informatika. Belgorodskiy natsional'nyy issledovatel'skiy universitet. Belgorod.
OK	- Orvostörténeti Közleményel (Communicationes de historia artis medicinae). Budapest Semmelweis

Lista abrevierilor de periodice

	Orvostortenetí Muzeum Es Konyvtar And Magyar Orvostortenelmi Tarsasag. Budapest.
Orizont	- Orizont. Timișoara.
ORP	- Odrodzenie i reformacja w Polsce. Instytut Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk. Warszawa.
PA	- Patrimonium Apulense. Direcția Județeană pentru Cultură Alba. Alba Iulia.
PB	- Patrimonium Banaticum. Direcția Județeană pentru Cultură Timiș. Timișoara.
Pediatria	- Pediatria de Atención Primaria. Publicación Oficial de la Asociación Española de Pediatría de Atención Primaria.
PH	- Prace Historyczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie.
Poarta Inimii	- Poarta inimii. Alba Iulia.
Programm Mühlbach	- Programm Mühlbach. Programm des evaghelischen Untergymnasium in Mühlbach und der damit verbundenen Lehranstalten. Sebeș.
PS	- Protestáns Szemle. Magyar Protestáns Irodalmi Társaság. Budapest.
RA	- Russkii arkhiv. Academic Publishing House Researcher. Bratislava.
RAPPS	- Revista de Administrație Publică și Politici Sociale. Universitatea de Vest „Vasile Goldiș” din Arad.
RB	- Revista Bistriței. Complexul Muzeal Bistrița-Năsăud. Bistrița.
RE	- Revista economică. Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu.
REF	- Revista de Etnografie și Folclor. Institutul de Etnografie și Folclor „Constantin Brăiloiu”. Academia Română. București.
Revista Arheologică	- Revista Arheologică. Centrul de Arheologie al Institutului Patrimoniului Cultural al Academiei de Științe a Moldovei. Chișinău.
RFR	- Revista Fundațiilor Regale. Revistă lunară de literatură, artă și cultură generală. București.
RH	- Roczniki Humanistyczne. Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II. Lublin.
RHSEE/RESEE	- Revue historique du sud-est européen. Academia Română. București, Paris (din 1963 Revue des études sud-est européennes).
RI	- Revista de Istorie (din 1990 Revista istorică). Academia Română. București.
RJMH	- The Romanian Journal of Modern History. Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Jassy.

RM	- Revista Muzeelor. București.
RMM	- Revista Muzeelor și Monumentelor. București.
RMV	- Revue de médecine vétérinaire. Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse.
România literară	- România literară. Săptămânal de literatură și artă. București.
Rossiiskaya istoriya	- Rossiiskaya istoriya. Akademicheskii nauchno-izdatel'skiy, proizvodstvenno-poligraficheskiy i knigorasprostranitel'skiy tsentr Nauka. Moskva.
RRH	- Revue Roumaine d'Histoire. Academia Română. București.
RT	- Revista Teologică (între anii 1956 și 1991 a apărut sub denumirea de Mitropolia Ardealului). Mitropolia Ardealului. Sibiu.
SA	- Sovetskaya arkheologiya. Akademiya Nauk SSSR. Moskva.
SAI	- Studii și articole de istorie. Societatea de Științe Istorice și Filologice a RPR. București.
Samus Sargetia	- Samus. Muzeul Municipal Dej. - Sargetia. Acta Musei Devensis. Muzeul Civilizației Dacice și Romane Deva.
SCA	- Studii și Cercetări de Antropologie. Institutul de Antropologie „Francisc I. Rainer”. Academia Română. București.
SCIA	- Studii și Cercetări de Istoria Artei. Seria Artă Plastică. București.
SCIV(A)	- Studii și cercetări de istoria veche (din 1974, Studii și cercetări de istorie veche și arheologie). București.
Slavyanskii al'manakh	- Slavyanskii al'manakh. Institut slavyanovedeniya Rossiiskoi akademii nauk. Moskva.
SMIC	- Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană. Institutul de Istorie „Nicolae Iorga” al Academiei Române. București.
SMIM	- Studii și materiale de istorie modernă. Institutul de Istorie „Nicolae Iorga” al Academiei Române. București.
Sovremennik	- Sovremennik. Sankt Petersburg.
SPST	- Sovremennye problem servisa i turizma. Russian State University of Tourism and Service. Moscow.
SS	- The Social Sciences. Western Social Association. Dubai.
Studia Studii	- Studia. Transilvania Express. Brașov. - Studii. Revistă de istorie (din 1974 Revista de istorie și din 1990 Revista istorică). Academia Română. București.

Lista abrevierilor de periodice

SUP	- Studi Umanistici Piceni. Istituto Internazionale di Studi Picensi. Sassoferato.
Századok	- Századok. A Magyar Történelmi Társulat. Budapest.
Terra Sebus	- Terra Sebus. Acta Musei Sabesiensis. Muzeul Municipal „Ioan Raica” Sebeș.
TIIAE	- Trudy Instituta Istorii, Arkheologii i Etnografii. Akademii Nauk Kazakhskoy Sovetskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Respubliki. Alma-Ata.
TNK	- Trudy NII kul'tury. Ministerstvo kul'tury RSFSR. Moskva.
TR	- Transylvanian Review. Centrul de Studii Transilvane al Academiei Române. Cluj-Napoca.
Transilvania	- Transilvania. Centrul Cultural Interetnic Transilvania. Sibiu.
TS	- Theologiai Szemle. A Magyarországi Egyházak Ökumenikus Tanácsa. Budapest.
TT	- Testimonia Theologica. Evanjelická bohoslovecká fakulta Komenského univerzity v Bratislave.
Unirea	- Unirea. Alba Iulia.
UR	- Ungarische Revue. Magyar Tudományos Akadémia. Budapest.
VAH	- Varia Archaeologica Hungarica. Budapest.
Valori bibliofile	- Valori bibliofile din patrimoniul cultural național. Cercetare, valorificare. Consiliul Culturii și Educației Socialiste. Muzeul Județean Vâlcea. Râmnicu Vâlcea.
VChGU	- Vestnik Chelyabinskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Chelyabinskii gosudarstvennyi universitet. Chelyabinsk.
VE	- Vestnik Evropy. Sankt Petersburg.
Verbum	- Verbum. Revista catolică. București.
Vestnik Tverskogo	- Vestnik Tverskogo Gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya Istoriya. Tver.
Vestnik VEGU	- Vestnik VEGU. Vostochnaya ekonomiko-yuridicheskaya gumanitarnaya akademiya. Akademiya VEGU. Ufa.
VI	- Voprosy istorii. Institut russkoy istorii Rossiyskoy akademii nauk. Moskva.
Viața românească	- Viața Românească. Revistă literară și științifică. Iași.
VMKK	- A Veszprém Megyei Múzeumok Közleményei. Veszprém.
Vox libri	- Vox libri. Biblioteca Județeană „Ovid Densusianu” Deva.
VS	- Voennyi Sbornik. Academic Publishing House Researcher. Bratislava.
VV	- Vestnik vospitaniya. Moskva.

- Zalai Múzeum** - Zalai Múzeum. Zala. Múzeumok Igazgatósága. Zalaegerszeg.
- ZfE** - Zeitschrift für Ethnologie. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerkunde und Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie Ethnologie und Urgeschichte. Berlin.
- ZfhWK** - Zeitschrift für historische Waffen- und Kostümkunde. Dresdner Verein für Waffenkunde. Berlin.
- ZfTZ** - Zeitschrift für Tierzüchtung und Züchtungsbiologie: Organ der Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft Tierzucht im Forschungsdienst (continua: Zeitschrift für Züchtung. Reihe B, Tierzüchtung und Züchtungsbiologie). Berlin, Hamburg.