SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS REGARDING THE VISIT OF GENERAL V. SIKORSKI TO THE USSR
(30 NOVEMBER-16 DECEMBER 1941)

Yakov Yakovlevich GRISHIN*

After the defeat of Poland in September 1939, a government-in-exile was formed in France, headed by General V. Sikorski. Shortly after this, the general also took the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish armed forces. Representatives of the Pilsudchiks, the Endeks, right-wing socialists and Lyudovtsevs joined his cabinet. In its first statements, the government in exile underlined that their main aim was “victory over Germany and the exclusion of Europe Bolshevization.” Its activities were based on the theory that there were “two enemies” of Poland (Germany and the USSR).

But with the USSR’s entrance into the war, the government-in-exile (which had moved in London in summer 1940 after the defeat of France) was obliged to change its tactics. On 23 June 1941, Sikorski gave a speech on the radio, directed to the Soviet Government, in which he offered to cooperate with them in order to fight against Hitlerite Germany.

The Soviet leadership responded positively to Sikorski’s words. Negotiations between the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General V. Sikorski, and the USSR’s Ambassador to England, I. M. Maysky, were initiated in London.

These negotiations were difficult. Nevertheless they finished with the signing, on 30 July 1941, of an Agreement between the USSR government and the Polish Republic Government regarding the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the creation of a Polish army in the territory of the USSR.

“1. The USSR government recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of the year 1939 concerning territorial changes in Poland as null and void. The

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1 Kwiatkowski 1942, p. 12.
2 Manusevich 1952, p. 334.
3 Pravda, 24 June 1941.
Polish Government declares Poland is not bound by any agreement with any third party which is directed against the Soviet Union.

2. Diplomatic relations will be re-established between both governments upon the signing of the present agreement and the immediate exchange of ambassadors will be executed.

3. Both governments are mutually obliged to provide each other with help and assistance in the war against Hitlerite Germany.

4. The USSR government expresses its consent to the creation in USSR territory of a Polish army under a commander appointed by the Polish government. The Polish army in USSR territory be operationally subordinate to the USSR High Command, which will include representatives of the Polish army. All details concerning command organization and the use of this force will be settled in a subsequent agreement.

5. The present agreement comes into effect immediately from the moment of its signing and is not applicable to ratification. The present agreement is drawn up in two copies, in the Polish and Russian languages, each carrying equal legal force.”

Minutes of the following content are attached to the Agreement:

“The Soviet government grants amnesty to all Polish citizens currently imprisoned in the Soviet territory as prisoners of war or on other sufficient grounds, effective from the reestablishment of diplomatic relations.”

Let us direct our attention to the point concerning the army. It was precisely the creation of such an army - the only real force at the Polish government-in-exile’s disposal whilst based in London - that was the main aim of General Sikorski’s military policy. From his point of view, the presence of an army accords importance in the international arena, and if Poland was lucky, at the point the war came to an end, such an army would make it possible to return power to the hands of the Polish bourgeoisie and landlord class.

The Russian side also had its own vision. On the one hand, it was committed to the execution of Allied obligations. On the other hand, it was felt that a joint march against a mutual enemy would radically change the interrelationships between two states and lay the groundwork for friendship and post-war cooperation of states and nations.

The political aspect of the formation of the Polish army was also important, and even more so was its participation in battles on the Soviet-German front line. Besides this, in the first hard months of war, successes of the Russian command were due in no small part to the participation in operations of every new combat force, especially the army.

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5 DMISPO 1973, doc. no. 133, p. 208; Pravda, 31 August 1941.
In order to implement the agreement of 30 July 1941, representatives of the Soviet and Polish commands signed a further military agreement on 14 August in Moscow, concerning details of the creation of a Polish army in USSR territory. General V. Anders was appointed as this army’s commander.

Despite many difficulties, this document began to take effect.

The Soviet government appointed Major General Zhukov Georgy Sergeevich to address the question of forming a Polish army in the USSR, and Colonel Volkovyyssky was appointed as his permanent liaison officer at Polish army headquarters. General A. Panfilov was appointed as Commissioner of the General Headquarters of the Red Army, Marshal Shaposhnikov became Deputy Chief of the General Headquarters and Colonel Evstigneev was appointed to the role of permanent liaison officer of the Red Army in Polish army headquarters.

A mixed Polish-Soviet military commission was created which could address organizational issues such as the mobilization of interned soldiers and volunteers and provisions for the newly-formed army.

In one of its early meetings, the locations for stationing army troops (in Buzuluk, Totsk, Tatishchevo) were determined, and plans were made to have the Polish units ready for action by 1 October 1941. Participants agreed that these units would consist of career soldiers who already had experience of war.

In these first weeks, General Anders spoke in favour of accelerating the pace at which these divisions were formed. As per his proposal, it “was recognized as expedient that at the termination of each division’s combat training they should be sent immediately to the Soviet-German front line.” Both these proposals corresponded to provisions in the military agreement of 14 August 1941.

The Soviet leadership did everything possible to support the formation of Polish units. As an article in *The Times* by U. Retinger (who acted as interim Polish Ambassador to Moscow until the arrival of S. Kot) noted:

“The Russian government gave practical evidence of its desire that a Polish army should be created as soon as possible, and provided the correspondent territory for training in the east of Volga. Having represented its own needs

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6 Ibid., doc. no. 140, p. 217-218.
7 Anders 1950, p. 76.
9 Ibid., p. 52.
to the governments of Great Britain and United States, the Soviet Union took into consideration provision for a Polish army of several divisions.”

A women’s auxiliary service was also formed. With regards to the position of the Poles, Dr Retinger said that they welcomed General Sikorski’ new policy direction with great enthusiasm and were ready to do everything in their power to provide a firm and reliable basis for future Russian-Polish relationships.

Discussions between Ambassador Kot and the USSR’s Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, S. A. Lozovsky, indicate the Soviet leadership’s goodwill and their aspiration to help the Polish side.

By the beginning of winter, several Polish military units had been formed. General Sikorski decided to visit the Soviet Union to negotiate with its leadership and visit the Polish army training grounds.

The Soviet leadership agreed with Sikorski the best time for his arrival in Moscow, as is evidenced in a note from Molotov S. to Sikorski dealing with this specific matter. At that time, Sikorski was in Egypt, from where he issued an order in which he underlined the great importance of the Polish army in the USSR. In this order we read:

“As the Phoenix rises from the ashes, in spite of numerous difficulties, there is a new Polish army in Russia. Her divisions, together with Soviet troops, accept an indefatigable battle for the freedom, unity and independence of Poland.”

As per the arrangement of 30 November 1941, Sikorski arrived in USSR from Tehran on an official visit. In Kuibyshev, he was met by the USSR’s Deputy Chairman of the Council of the People’s Commissars, A. Vysinsky.

On the day of his arrival, Sikorski was received by the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, M. I. Kalinin. The first ever visit of the head of the Polish government to the USSR, according to Soviet government opinion, was of great significance “for strengthening the friendly relations between the two Governments, as well as for the further conduct of the war against our common enemy.” An official comment was published in which it was noted that “the arrival of the head of

10 DMISPO 1973, doc. no. 133, p. 229.
11 Ibid., doc. no. 148, p. 229.
12 Ibid., doc. no. 149, p. 230-233.
13 Anders 1950, p. 76.
14 Pobóg-Malinowski 1960, p. 196.
15 Polskíé siły zbrojne 1975, p. 277.
17 Pravda, 30 November 1941.
government of a friendly Poland is undoubtedly a positive moment, as it strengthens the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Polish Republic.”

On 2 December, Sikorski flew from Kuibyshev to Moscow. At the Central Airport, he was met by a group of Soviet representatives headed by V. Molotov. The Polish guests were accommodated at the Hotel Moscow.

The next day, as reported by the newspaper Pravda,

“in the evening, in the Kremlin, the Chairman of the Council of the People’s Commissars of the USSR and the People’s Commissar of Defence, Comrade I. V. Stalin, received in the presence of the People’s Commissar on Foreign Affairs, Comrade V. M. Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic, General V. Sikorski. General Sikorski was accompanied by the Ambassador of the Polish Republic, Mr. Kot, and the commander of the Polish Army in the USSR, General Anders. The talks lasted more than two hours.”

In spite of a critical situation on the front line that day, Stalin found time for negotiations with the Polish head of state. The talks covered a wide range of issues, mainly military: the expansion of the Polish army contingent, its maintenance funding, its location for the period of its formation in Central Asia, and the resettlement of Polish citizens there. The Soviet negotiators also raised the question of the principles regarding borders, but the Polish head of state avoided discussion of this. Negotiations between the Polish delegation and the leaders of the Soviet government continued the following day.

As evidenced by the minutes of these talks, they were sometimes strained. According to Kot, “The Soviets hoped to discuss the outstanding problems of Soviet-Polish relations (borders, the conclusion of agreements of friendship).” However, Sikorski missed these opportunities, limiting the discussion to two issues: the Polish population in the USSR and the army. This was likely explained by the fact that Sikorski was assuming

“the possible defeat of the Soviet Union, without realising that it was only a matter of hours before the great attack under Moscow (would commence), and that during his visit he would have to congratulate the Soviet government with the defeat of the fascist German troops near Moscow.”

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18 Pravda, 2 December 1941.
19 Pravda, 4 December 1941.
20 Stanisławska 1965.
22 Kot 1955, p. 82-98.
Anders added fuel to the fire, representing the army’s position in the darkest colours. Sikorski, without knowing all the intentions of his subordinate and his plans for the withdrawal of the Polish units from the Soviet Union, supported him based on what he had heard.

However, the Prime Minister knew better than Anders that the USSR was an important source of reserves who could swell the ranks of the Polish army, since attempts to recruit soldiers amongst Poles living in the USA, Canada and Latin America, had failed. That, incidentally, was a kind of reckoning for the improper treatment of American-Canadian Poles who had arrived in the newly-recreated Poland in 1918 in order to protect it. Having fulfilled their duty, these soldiers should have been sent home by the Polish leadership. However, the government treated the fate of their expatriate countrymen with disregard, leaving them to make their own way back - in other words, abandoning them to their fate. Given this, it is unsurprising that the appeals of the Polish government-in-exile in London were left unanswered by the Polish diaspora in the USA, Canada and Latin America.

It was no accident, then, that Sikorski questioned the withdrawal of the whole army from the Soviet Union, and furthermore put forward a proposal to increase its strength and to identify new training areas in the southern regions of the USSR. Stalin agreed to increase the ranks of the Polish Army and to the armament of one more division, the rest to be done at England and the United States’ expense. In the end, Moscow took the following decisions on military questions: the army would consist of seven divisions (up to 96,000 people), who would be transferred to Central Asia. Their equipment, armament and food would be distributed according to the norms of the Red Army, and they would be sent to the front line only after receiving military training for combat readiness; all Polish citizens liable for call-up should be drafted to the Polish army, wherever they might be; and a new loan would be granted for the army’s maintenance.23

Besides this, the Soviets agreed to the evacuation of 25,000 soldiers to the Middle East and Great Britain, and to the discharge of Poles serving in labour battalions who would be transferred to the disposal of the Polish authorities.

Seeing the favourable attitude of the Soviet government towards increasing the ranks of the Polish Army, Sikorski, despite promises to Churchill, agreed that the army would remain in the Soviet Union and would take part in battles on the Soviet-German front line.

In his letter to Churchill, Sikorski explained his position as follows:

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“If I had demanded the evacuation of the Polish army, I would never be able to recruit new soldiers and would not bring any benefit to the Polish civil population, which is currently in Russia.”

In addition to the above, the Soviet government adopted all the new proposals of the Polish side aimed at improving the situation of Poles in Soviet Union territory, agreeing to the organization of additional diplomatic missions on the ground, granting a loan of 100 million rubles to assist the civilian population, and permitting the further organization of embassy delegates in places with large concentrations of Poles.

In the end, as a result of two days of talks, the important practical issues were solved and the Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Aid between the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Polish Republic was signed, by Stalin on behalf of the Soviet Government, Sikorski on behalf of the Polish one. In the declaration, both governments, “filled with spirit of friendly agreement and combat cooperation,” proclaimed that the Soviet Union and Poland, together with Britain and other allies, and with the support of the United States, would “fight the war to complete victory and the final destruction of the German invaders,” that the Polish army in the USSR territory would “fight the war against the German robbers hand in hand with the Soviet troops” that after the war they would collaborate to ensure a “just and lasting peace.”

This program of military cooperation opened up the prospect of genuinely friendly relations between the two neighbouring countries and their governments.

While in Moscow, Sikorski spoke on the local radio, and an interview with him was published in the Red Star (Krasnaja zvezda). In honour of his eminent Polish guest, Stalin gave a dinner party at the Kremlin. Sikorski’s meeting with Stalin was of great importance. A documentary “The Stay in Moscow of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic, General V. Sikorski” regarding the visit of the Polish head of state was filmed and widely advertised.

On 5 December, Sikorski and those who accompanied him flew back to Kuibyshev. As is known, that day the Red Army began a counter-offensive near Moscow. On 7 December, General Sikorski arranged a great reception at the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev, and on 10 December he

24 Stanislawska 1965, p. 254.
25 Pravda, 5 December 1941.
26 Izvestia, 5 December 1941.
27 Pravda, 5 December 1941.
went by train to Buzuluk in order to inspect the Polish army garrisoned there.28

In Buzuluk, Sikorski mustered the Polish forces and signed a decree conferring new ranks to 130 officers. On that occasion, he gave a speech in which he stressed the importance of the Polish-Soviet treaty. He noted that he was accepted with joy by all the Polish people, and that no one gives Poland to the Poles: they must take it themselves. A new Poland, as Stalin said in the Kremlin, should be bigger and stronger than the pre-war Poland.29

Also in Buzuluk, he organized a reception in honour of the army commanders at the Polish Army headquarters. At this reception he gave a speech, repeating the basic provisions of the Declaration of December 4th, and was met with thunderous applause from the guests and officers of the Polish Army. General Anders words elicited no less applause: “For me personally, it would be a cause of great happiness to receive the first operational order of the Soviet High Command to march to the front line.”

From Buzuluk, General Sikorski went to Totskoe - a settlement in Chkalov area where the 6th and 7th Divisions of the Polish Army were garrisoned, and from there to Tatishevo, in the same area, where the 5th Division was accommodated. In both camps, Sikorski attended military parades and religious ceremonies, arranged receptions and delivered patriotic speeches.30

In an order published on the occasion of his visit to Totskoe, he stressed that “in the joint struggle of Polish and the Soviet soldiers will be forged a happy social and political future for our two countries and the people living in them.”31

In general, “Sikorski was satisfied with the inspections he conducted of military units in Totsk and Tatischevo.”32 The troops looked very fine and Sikorski was welcomed everywhere enthusiastically. The 5th Division made the greatest impression on him. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief was pleased by what he saw, and forgot about the worries and doubts that oppressed him in the first days of his stay in the Soviet Union.

In Saratov, Sikorski and General Zhukov concluded an agreement regarding cooperation in the field of military intelligence and

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28 Klimkowski 1959, p. 165-166.
30 Ibid.
31 Dziennik Polski, 24 December 1941.
32 Żaroń 1988, p. 168.
communications between underground organizations in the country and the relevant Soviet military authorities.

On 15 December, Sikorski sent a telegram to Stalin, in which he wrote:

“Minister Vishinskiy informed me about the new victories achieved by the heroic Red Army on the front lines of the enemy offensive. I express to you, the Leader, the creator of this army, my admiration for these actions in the fight for a common goal, the goal of people’s freedom. I am deeply convinced that the current victories in the south of and near Moscow are harbingers of a decisive and final victory in the nearest future.”

On 16 December, according to N. Novikov:

“Saratov authorities gave a dinner party in honour of the General, then invited him and all his companions to see a play at the Moscow Art Theatre, *The Three Sisters*. On the morning of the 17th, solemnly escorted by a guard of honour from the Saratov garrison, Sikorski flew to Baku, (from where he would) travel to Tehran and Cairo. On the trip to Baku, he was accompanied by all his retinue, General Anders, Colonel Evstigneev and I. However, we did not fly to Baku in one day, but stayed the night in Astrakhan. On the morning of the 18th air travel resumed, and before noon our plane arrived in Baku. The next day Evstigneev, myself and representatives of the Azerbaijani authorities said goodbye at the airport with the outstanding guest, who left on the Soviet plane to Tehran.”

In connection with Sikorski’s departure, a question arises as to why he left the USSR advance of the date scheduled. The original plan was that during his visit Sikorski would visit Polish units in Central Asia, where many Poles lived, and then return to Moscow for further talks with Stalin.

However, while Sikorski was in Saratov, Britain’s Foreign Minister Anthony Eden came to Moscow in order to discuss Anglo-Soviet relations. His trip was kept a strict secret. However, before leaving the Soviet Union, Sikorski was informed about the upcoming visit of the British Foreign Office head, although he did not know its terms and, apparently, did not anticipate that it would happen during his stay in the USSR.

Despite Eden’s arrival in Moscow, Vishinskiy assured Sikorski that “Stalin does not go back on his word, and is ready to receive General Sikorski regardless of how Eden and Sikorski decide the question of their simultaneous stay in Moscow.” As V. S. Parsadanova writes:

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33 *Pravda*, 15 December 1941.
34 Novikov 1989, p. 110.
36 Kukiel 1981, p. 188.
“Sikorski did not want to be the poor cousin. Ambassador Kot told the Soviet leadership that Sikorski had come down with the flu. It would certainly have been conceivable to catch a cold during that trip, especially given that frosts in the Volga region could reach -40 degrees, but it was characteristic for the General to feel ill in difficult situations. He had been so in the summer of 1940 while battling an attempt to overthrow him from his post as prime minister, and he would be so again in April 1943, when he heard from Goebbels about (the) Katyn (massacre).”

Analysis of documentary evidence shows that Sikorski cut short the time he spent in the USSR not because of illness, but for political reasons. Of course, his stay in the country required great physical and mental effort from him, but during the next two weeks in the Middle East, the General worked intensively, met with politicians and diplomats and wrote a great deal. Mitkevich testifies that that when Sikorski returned to London he was “well, looked great and was in a good mood.” So his health was not the issue in this case. As Parsadanova observes:

“The international situation in December 1941 became quite different than it was when Sikorski left London. The Soviet victory near Moscow, the Japanese attack on the United States, a new balance of forces in the anti-Hitler coalition - all these had to be comprehended: at the ‘club’ of great empires with a contribution of at least 5 million soldiers, the position and weight of Poland were obviously much weakened.”

In addition, having agreed with Stalin all issues related to the formation of the Polish army and the civilian population, Sikorski was not ready for further negotiations on Polish-Soviet relations, including the eastern borders. He applied his motto: “If you say nothing, it is either because you can not or do not want to tell the truth.”

Nevertheless, Sikorski, arrived in Tehran and met with foreign correspondents and, in the course of his conversations with them, expressed a high opinion of the results of his USSR visit. In particular, the General said “that he was very pleased with the trip to the USSR, where he stayed for three weeks and had a meeting with Stalin, during which the issue of the Polish army’s participation in the war was solved.” A large Polish army, consisting of several divisions, would be formed to fight as an independent military unit. Together with Vyshinsky, Sikorski said that he had visited three Polish divisions, in which morale was high. As per Stalin’s order, all Polish citizens had been released and hundreds of thousands of

38 Mitkiewicz 1968, p. 104.
Poles would be transferred to the southern regions of the USSR, where suitable conditions would be created for them. Sikorski also said that Soviet authorities had assured him that Polish soldiers would, in accordance with the USSR Constitution, be given full freedom of religion. He also stated that Stalin impressed him as great realist and a great statesman. The attitude of the Soviet people towards the Polish citizens was friendly and cordial, and the Polish-Soviet declaration had made a great impression on the Soviet people.

When asked what he thought of the success of the Red Army in the last days, Sikorski said:

“All that is has been printed on that story conforms fully to reality. Soviet troops not only stopped the German advance, but threw them off. The most important direction was, I believe, the south, where Kleist’s army was completely destroyed, and the Moscow area where victories of great strategic importance were achieved. Leningrad, Moscow and the Caucasus are in complete safety. Stalin told me that German soldiers now resemble Napoleon’s soldiers during their retreat from Russia. The German position is all the more hopeless since they have no supplies nearby. But we must not think that the war will be over this winter. We must be prepared for new attacks by the Germans at the beginning of the next year. I believe that the Polish army will take an active part in this offensive by the Red Army.”

Unfortunately that did not happen. The Polish army was withdrawn to Iran at the moment the Battle of Stalingrad started. During the first and second evacuations to the Middle East from the USSR, more than 140,000 thousand Poles in total, of which 78,470 were soldiers, were evacuated. This was a huge force that could have fought shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army near Stalingrad.

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Soviet-Polish Relations Regarding the Visit of General V. Sikorski to the USSR
(30 October-16 December 1941)

(Abstract)

This article deals with Soviet-Polish relations during the Second World War, which have for many years, especially since the demise of the Soviet Union, been subject to revision and falsification. Particular emphasis is placed on the period during the Second World War, when these relations were of an ambiguous nature.

The Poles never forgave the fact that on 17 September 1939 the Red Army crossed the pre-war border and occupied the territory of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, forgetting that, firstly, these territories had been forcibly annexed by the II Rzeczpospolita

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40 DMISPO 1973, doc. no. 177, p. 269; Pravda, 22 December 1941.
41 Zaroń 1988, p. 169.
(Second Polish Republic) from Soviet Russia during the Civil War, and secondly, that on that day the Polish government, including the Supreme Commander, abandoned the country, the people and the army to the whims of fate and fled to Romania, where they were interned.

To replace this imprisoned government, a new Polish cabinet headed by General V. Sikorski was formed in France. One of its first actions was to issue a decree in which it declared itself in a state of war with the Soviet Union. In addition, it stated the non-recognition of the reunion of the Ukrainian SSR and Belorussian SSR areas of Western Ukraine and Belarus, and declared its intention to fight for the return of these regions to Poland.

It was under these conditions of huge national tragedy that Sikorski’s government took an anti-Soviet position. Naturally, for the Polish government-in-exile (which after the defeat of France had moved to London) to take such a position was not conducive to the establishment of normal relations with the Soviet Union.

In an effort to consolidate the forces of all the enemies of Nazi Germany, the Soviet leadership considered it appropriate to bring the governments-in-exile into the existing Soviet-Anglo-American coalition, and to push these governments to take an active role in the struggle for liberation.

Only after the Soviet Union’s offensive defence had blocked Hitler’s plan of Blitzkrieg, thus proving its strength and ability to defeat the enemy, did Sikorski withdraw from his divisive theory of “two enemies,” the expression of which was the signing of the Polish-Soviet agreement of 30 July 1941.

Sikorski’s official visit to Russia in 1941 was of great importance in the establishment of these bilateral relations, and an analysis of this visit forms the main content of this article.

**Bibliographical Abbreviations**

Soviet-Polish Relations Regarding the Visit of General V. Sikorski to the USSR


Keywords: V. Sikorski, A. Vyshinsky, I. Stalin, Buzuluk, Tatishchevo, Totskoye, Polish army.
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAMT</td>
<td>Advances in Archaeological Method and Theory. Orlando.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art-menedzher</td>
<td>Art-menedzher. Business magazine considering culture and art as a resource for the social and economic development of society and offering various technologies and methodologies of management of this process. Moscow.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Byilyie godyi</td>
<td>Byilyie godyi. Sochi State University. Sochi.</td>
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<td>CAn</td>
<td>Current Anthropology. Chicago.</td>
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<td>CHR</td>
<td>The Canadian Historical Review. University of Toronto Press. Toronto.</td>
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IAIAND - Istoriko-arkheologicheskie issledovaniya v g. Azove i na Nizhnem Donu v 2006 g., Don.
Istoriografiya - Istorografiya i istochnikovedenieistorii stran Azii i Afriki. Leningrad State University. Leningrad.
Istoriya i sovremennost' - Istoriya i sovremennost'. Moscow.
IzvSamarsk - Izvestiia Samarskogo nauchnogo tsentra RAN. Samara.
Kulturnoe nasledie - Kulturnoe nasledie. Altai State University, Altai Territory, Barnaul.
LKK - Literatura i kultura v Kitaе. Moscow.
JIISV - Jekonomicheskie i istoricheskie issledovaniya na Severo-Vostoke SSSR. Economic and historical research in the North-East of the USSR. Magadan.
Marketing - Marketing. Centre for Marketing Research and Management. Moscow.
MENP - Materialy po evoliycii nazemnykh pozvochnykh. Moscow.
MIA - Materialy po istorii i archeologii SSSR. Moscow, Saint Petersburg.
MIFFK - Materialy po istorii fauny i flory Kazahstana. Kazakhstan.
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<td>MUSEUM</td>
<td>MUSEUM, UNESCO.</td>
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<td>Nauchnoye obozreniye</td>
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<td>NKOGK</td>
<td>Obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v Kitae: XXXIX nauchnaia konferentsiia. Moscow.</td>
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<td>NNZ</td>
<td>Novgorod i Novgorodskaya zemlya. Istoriya i arkheologiya. Veliki Novgorod.</td>
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<td>Novosti</td>
<td>Russian News Agency “Novosti.” Moscow.</td>
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<td>NTB</td>
<td>Nauchnyye i tekhnicheskiye biblioteki. The State Public Scientific and Technical Library Russia. Moscow.</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
<td>Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost. Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow.</td>
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<td>OT</td>
<td>Otechestvennyye zapiski. Saint Petersburg.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prizrenie</td>
<td>Prizrenie i blagotvoritel’nost’ v Rossii. Izdanie Vserossijskogo sojuza uchrezhdnenij, obshhestv i dejatelej po obshhestvennomu i chastnomu prizreniju. Saint Petersburg.</td>
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<td>PT</td>
<td>Perspectives on Terrorism. The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) headquartered in Vienna, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS) headquartered at the University of Massachussetts’ Lowell campus. Massachusetts.</td>
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<td>RA</td>
<td>Rossiiskaia Arkheologiia. Moscow.</td>
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<td>Reka vremen</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>Sovetskaja Arkheologija. Institute of Archaeology, Russia, Moscow. Moscow.</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Sviyazhskie chteniya. Sviyazhsk.</td>
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<td>Serdalo</td>
<td>Obschenacionalnaya gaseta Respubliki Ingushetiya “Serdalo.” Nazran.</td>
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<td>SGV</td>
<td>Saratovskie gubernskie vedomosti. Saratov.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SV - Sovremennaya filologiya. Ufa.

SZ - Sociologicheskiy zhurnal. Moscow.

Tarih Dergisi - Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi. Istanbul.

TKA - Tulski kраevedchesky almanah. Tula.


Trudovaya pomoshch’ - Trudovaya pomoshch’. Izdanie Popechitel’stva o trudovoj pomoshhi. Saint Petersburg.

Vestnik AAJ - Vestnik arheologii, antropologii i jetnografii. Institute of Problems of Development of the North, Russia. Tyumen.


Vestnik Kazak - Vestnik Akademii nauk Kazakhskoy SSR. Academy of Science of the Kazakh SSR. Kazakhstan.


Vestnik Samara - Vestnik Samarskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Samara State University. Samara.


Vestnik Semej - Vestnik gosudarstvennogo universiteta imeni Shakarima goroda Semej. Shakarim State University of Semey.


Voprosi Literatury - Voprosi Literatury. Writer’s Union of the USSR. Moscow.


VTP - Istoricheskiye, filosofskiye, politicheskiye i yuridicheskiye nauki, kul’turologiya i iskusstvovedeniye. Voprosy teorii i praktiki. Tambov.

